1 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:06,400 All the rest of you who've made this work, I'm looking at a whole battery of people down 2 00:00:06,400 --> 00:00:11,360 here at KPFK in Los Angeles and those of you in KPFA. 3 00:00:11,360 --> 00:00:12,360 Thank you very much. 4 00:00:12,360 --> 00:00:13,360 We'll be with you tomorrow. 5 00:00:13,360 --> 00:00:35,960 I'm Jerry Brown for We The People. 6 00:00:35,960 --> 00:00:38,360 That's Small Deep singing Street Life. 7 00:00:38,360 --> 00:00:42,400 Do you think Shakespeare would have liked rap if he was still alive? 8 00:00:42,400 --> 00:00:44,480 I mean, he would have liked some of it. 9 00:00:44,480 --> 00:00:49,080 This Tuesday at 10 p.m. the Arts Magazine celebrates Shakespeare's birthday, born the 10 00:00:49,080 --> 00:00:52,040 week of April 23rd, 1564. 11 00:00:52,040 --> 00:00:55,040 Tramiel, how would the rappers say that? 12 00:00:55,040 --> 00:00:56,520 It's party time. 13 00:00:56,520 --> 00:00:57,520 That's right. 14 00:00:57,520 --> 00:01:12,360 This Tuesday at 10 p.m. on WBAI 99.5 FM. 15 00:01:12,720 --> 00:01:18,720 And it's exactly 8 o'clock, which means it's time for another edition of Off The Hook here 16 00:01:18,720 --> 00:01:20,720 on WBAI New York. 17 00:02:42,720 --> 00:02:43,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 18 00:02:43,720 --> 00:02:44,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 19 00:02:44,720 --> 00:02:45,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 20 00:02:45,720 --> 00:02:46,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 21 00:02:46,720 --> 00:02:47,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 22 00:02:47,720 --> 00:02:48,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 23 00:02:48,720 --> 00:02:49,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 24 00:02:49,720 --> 00:02:50,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 25 00:02:50,720 --> 00:02:51,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 26 00:02:51,720 --> 00:02:52,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 27 00:02:52,720 --> 00:02:53,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 28 00:02:53,720 --> 00:02:54,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 29 00:02:54,720 --> 00:02:55,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 30 00:02:55,720 --> 00:02:56,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 31 00:02:56,720 --> 00:02:57,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 32 00:02:57,720 --> 00:02:58,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 33 00:02:58,720 --> 00:02:59,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 34 00:02:59,720 --> 00:03:00,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 35 00:03:00,720 --> 00:03:01,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 36 00:03:01,720 --> 00:03:02,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 37 00:03:02,720 --> 00:03:03,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 38 00:03:03,720 --> 00:03:04,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 39 00:03:04,720 --> 00:03:05,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 40 00:03:05,720 --> 00:03:06,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 41 00:03:06,720 --> 00:03:07,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 42 00:03:07,720 --> 00:03:08,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 43 00:03:08,720 --> 00:03:09,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 44 00:03:09,720 --> 00:03:10,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 45 00:03:10,720 --> 00:03:11,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 46 00:03:11,720 --> 00:03:12,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 47 00:03:12,720 --> 00:03:13,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 48 00:03:13,720 --> 00:03:14,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 49 00:03:14,720 --> 00:03:15,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 50 00:03:15,720 --> 00:03:16,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 51 00:03:16,720 --> 00:03:17,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 52 00:03:17,720 --> 00:03:18,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 53 00:03:18,720 --> 00:03:19,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 54 00:03:19,720 --> 00:03:20,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 55 00:03:20,720 --> 00:03:21,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 56 00:03:21,720 --> 00:03:22,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 57 00:03:22,720 --> 00:03:23,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 58 00:03:23,720 --> 00:03:24,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 59 00:03:24,720 --> 00:03:25,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 60 00:03:25,720 --> 00:03:26,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 61 00:03:27,720 --> 00:03:28,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 62 00:03:28,720 --> 00:03:29,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 63 00:03:29,720 --> 00:03:30,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 64 00:03:30,720 --> 00:03:31,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 65 00:03:31,720 --> 00:03:32,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 66 00:03:32,720 --> 00:03:33,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 67 00:03:33,720 --> 00:03:34,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 68 00:03:34,720 --> 00:03:35,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 69 00:03:35,720 --> 00:03:36,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 70 00:03:36,720 --> 00:03:37,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 71 00:03:37,720 --> 00:03:38,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 72 00:03:38,720 --> 00:03:39,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 73 00:03:39,720 --> 00:03:40,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 74 00:03:40,720 --> 00:03:41,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 75 00:03:41,720 --> 00:03:42,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 76 00:03:42,720 --> 00:03:43,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 77 00:03:43,720 --> 00:03:44,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 78 00:03:44,720 --> 00:03:45,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 79 00:03:45,720 --> 00:03:46,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 80 00:03:46,720 --> 00:03:47,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 81 00:03:47,720 --> 00:03:48,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 82 00:03:48,720 --> 00:03:49,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 83 00:03:50,720 --> 00:03:51,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 84 00:03:51,720 --> 00:03:52,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 85 00:03:52,720 --> 00:03:53,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 86 00:03:53,720 --> 00:03:54,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 87 00:03:54,720 --> 00:03:55,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 88 00:03:55,720 --> 00:03:56,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 89 00:03:56,720 --> 00:03:57,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 90 00:03:57,720 --> 00:03:58,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 91 00:03:58,720 --> 00:03:59,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 92 00:03:59,720 --> 00:04:00,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 93 00:04:00,720 --> 00:04:01,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 94 00:04:01,720 --> 00:04:02,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 95 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--> 00:04:19,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 112 00:04:19,720 --> 00:04:20,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 113 00:04:20,720 --> 00:04:21,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 114 00:04:21,720 --> 00:04:22,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 115 00:04:22,720 --> 00:04:23,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 116 00:04:23,720 --> 00:04:24,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 117 00:04:24,720 --> 00:04:25,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 118 00:04:25,720 --> 00:04:26,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 119 00:04:26,720 --> 00:04:27,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 120 00:04:27,720 --> 00:04:28,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 121 00:04:28,720 --> 00:04:29,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 122 00:04:29,720 --> 00:04:30,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 123 00:04:30,720 --> 00:04:31,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 124 00:04:31,720 --> 00:04:32,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 125 00:04:32,720 --> 00:04:33,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 126 00:04:33,720 --> 00:04:34,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 127 00:04:34,720 --> 00:04:35,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 128 00:04:35,720 --> 00:04:36,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 129 00:04:36,720 --> 00:04:37,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 130 00:04:37,720 --> 00:04:38,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 131 00:04:38,720 --> 00:04:39,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 132 00:04:39,720 --> 00:04:40,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 133 00:04:40,720 --> 00:04:41,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 134 00:04:41,720 --> 00:04:42,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 135 00:04:42,720 --> 00:04:43,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 136 00:04:43,720 --> 00:04:44,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 137 00:04:44,720 --> 00:04:45,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 138 00:04:45,720 --> 00:04:46,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 139 00:04:46,720 --> 00:04:47,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 140 00:04:47,720 --> 00:04:48,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 141 00:04:48,720 --> 00:04:49,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 142 00:04:49,720 --> 00:04:50,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 143 00:04:50,720 --> 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00:05:25,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 176 00:05:25,720 --> 00:05:26,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 177 00:05:26,720 --> 00:05:27,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 178 00:05:27,720 --> 00:05:28,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 179 00:05:28,720 --> 00:05:29,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 180 00:05:29,720 --> 00:05:30,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 181 00:05:30,720 --> 00:05:31,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 182 00:05:31,720 --> 00:05:32,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 183 00:05:32,720 --> 00:05:33,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 184 00:05:33,720 --> 00:05:34,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 185 00:05:34,720 --> 00:05:35,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 186 00:05:35,720 --> 00:05:36,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 187 00:05:36,720 --> 00:05:37,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 188 00:05:37,720 --> 00:05:38,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 189 00:05:38,720 --> 00:05:39,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 190 00:05:39,720 --> 00:05:40,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 191 00:05:40,720 --> 00:05:41,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 192 00:05:41,720 --> 00:05:42,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 193 00:05:43,720 --> 00:05:44,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 194 00:05:44,720 --> 00:05:45,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 195 00:05:45,720 --> 00:05:46,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 196 00:05:46,720 --> 00:05:47,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 197 00:05:47,720 --> 00:05:48,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 198 00:05:48,720 --> 00:05:49,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 199 00:05:49,720 --> 00:05:50,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 200 00:05:50,720 --> 00:05:51,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 201 00:05:51,720 --> 00:05:52,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 202 00:05:52,720 --> 00:05:53,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 203 00:05:53,720 --> 00:05:54,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 204 00:05:54,720 --> 00:05:55,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 205 00:05:55,720 --> 00:05:56,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 206 00:05:56,720 --> 00:05:57,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 207 00:05:57,720 --> 00:05:58,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 208 00:05:58,720 --> 00:05:59,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 209 00:05:59,720 --> 00:06:00,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 210 00:06:00,720 --> 00:06:01,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 211 00:06:01,720 --> 00:06:02,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 212 00:06:02,720 --> 00:06:03,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 213 00:06:03,720 --> 00:06:04,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 214 00:06:04,720 --> 00:06:05,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 215 00:06:06,720 --> 00:06:07,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 216 00:06:07,720 --> 00:06:08,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 217 00:06:08,720 --> 00:06:09,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 218 00:06:09,720 --> 00:06:10,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 219 00:06:10,720 --> 00:06:11,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 220 00:06:11,720 --> 00:06:12,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 221 00:06:12,720 --> 00:06:13,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 222 00:06:13,720 --> 00:06:14,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 223 00:06:14,720 --> 00:06:15,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 224 00:06:15,720 --> 00:06:16,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 225 00:06:16,720 --> 00:06:17,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 226 00:06:17,720 --> 00:06:18,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 227 00:06:18,720 --> 00:06:19,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 228 00:06:19,720 --> 00:06:20,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 229 00:06:20,720 --> 00:06:21,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 230 00:06:21,720 --> 00:06:22,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 231 00:06:22,720 --> 00:06:23,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 232 00:06:23,720 --> 00:06:24,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 233 00:06:24,720 --> 00:06:25,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 234 00:06:25,720 --> 00:06:26,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 235 00:06:26,720 --> 00:06:27,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 236 00:06:27,720 --> 00:06:28,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 237 00:06:29,720 --> 00:06:30,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 238 00:06:30,720 --> 00:06:31,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 239 00:06:31,720 --> 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00:08:40,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 368 00:08:40,720 --> 00:08:41,720 It's time for Off The Hook. 369 00:08:42,720 --> 00:08:43,720 This is unbelievable. 370 00:08:43,720 --> 00:08:44,720 Have you seen things like this before? 371 00:08:44,720 --> 00:08:45,720 Uh, no. 372 00:08:45,720 --> 00:08:48,720 I've never seen anything quite this blatant before. 373 00:08:48,720 --> 00:08:49,720 Blatant is the word. 374 00:08:49,720 --> 00:08:53,720 And, you know, I can only imagine what kind of response this is going to get from people. 375 00:08:53,720 --> 00:08:58,720 I mean, is this true they can change the message ID of the email? 376 00:08:58,720 --> 00:09:01,720 Well, you can change anything you want in the header of a message when it's going out. 377 00:09:01,720 --> 00:09:07,720 But, I mean, as you yourself saw when you did a trace route, that you could see who their provider was. 378 00:09:07,720 --> 00:09:08,720 Oh, yeah. 379 00:09:08,720 --> 00:09:09,720 That's true. 380 00:09:09,720 --> 00:09:11,720 It wasn't any real big secret there. 381 00:09:11,720 --> 00:09:16,720 Can you send out a piece of mail and have it not be detectable? 382 00:09:16,720 --> 00:09:17,720 No. 383 00:09:17,720 --> 00:09:22,720 It's always going to say, whoever receives the email, if you receive the email, in the header of the message, 384 00:09:22,720 --> 00:09:25,720 it's going to say what system that email came from. 385 00:09:25,720 --> 00:09:32,720 Even if that system decided to modify its header, if it was used as a relay, 386 00:09:32,720 --> 00:09:36,720 if that system modified the header of the message before it reached you, 387 00:09:36,720 --> 00:09:41,720 that is, if it was in the middle, then all you're going to see is the fact that it came from the last hop. 388 00:09:41,720 --> 00:09:43,720 But you're still going to see that it came from somewhere. 389 00:09:43,720 --> 00:09:49,720 Now, the only way that these people would be hiding where it is that this email is coming from 390 00:09:49,720 --> 00:09:54,720 is if they were redirecting the outgoing email to other people's mail servers. 391 00:09:54,720 --> 00:09:58,720 Which they say they did at one point, but they don't do that anymore because the people got angry. 392 00:09:58,720 --> 00:10:00,720 Well, I'd get angry. 393 00:10:00,720 --> 00:10:01,720 Yeah. 394 00:10:01,720 --> 00:10:02,720 In fact, some people were doing that at 2600. 395 00:10:03,720 --> 00:10:08,720 We noticed some things bouncing around that weren't coming from us, and that's kind of nasty. 396 00:10:08,720 --> 00:10:14,720 But they're claiming that they no longer need to do that because of this new method of disguising where they're coming from. 397 00:10:14,720 --> 00:10:17,720 And you have to wonder, how legitimate can these people possibly be? 398 00:10:17,720 --> 00:10:22,720 They're sending out 150,000 of these things an hour, 399 00:10:22,720 --> 00:10:29,720 and their main goal is just to remain totally anonymous and not be found. 400 00:10:29,720 --> 00:10:34,720 I mean, that's fine for somebody trying to get across a message of some sort that there's some risk involved in. 401 00:10:34,720 --> 00:10:38,720 But these are people trying to sell quote-unquote legitimate products. 402 00:10:38,720 --> 00:10:40,720 I don't think people like that. 403 00:10:40,720 --> 00:10:43,720 How much junk mail do you get in your mailbox now? 404 00:10:43,720 --> 00:10:45,720 I get junk mail every single day. 405 00:10:45,720 --> 00:10:47,720 Over the past few months, I think it's grown. 406 00:10:47,720 --> 00:10:48,720 It's skyrocketed. 407 00:10:48,720 --> 00:10:49,720 Yeah. 408 00:10:49,720 --> 00:10:54,720 Now, what can we, as mere mortals, do to fight this? 409 00:10:54,720 --> 00:10:55,720 We can do anything. 410 00:10:55,720 --> 00:10:58,720 We can only hope that the powers that be take down sites like this. 411 00:10:58,720 --> 00:11:01,720 See, now, I don't usually advocate things like this. 412 00:11:01,720 --> 00:11:03,720 But I don't know. 413 00:11:03,720 --> 00:11:08,720 When you get this worked up about it, when you see people just blatantly bombing you with all kinds of junk, 414 00:11:08,720 --> 00:11:10,720 you've got to do something about it. 415 00:11:10,720 --> 00:11:12,720 You know, what's going to stop these people? 416 00:11:12,720 --> 00:11:13,720 Yeah. 417 00:11:13,720 --> 00:11:14,720 They have to get the message somehow. 418 00:11:14,720 --> 00:11:18,720 Obviously, they don't want to hear the message from us because you can't mail them back and say, 419 00:11:18,720 --> 00:11:22,720 you know, I really hate you with a passion that you just could not believe. 420 00:11:22,720 --> 00:11:23,720 They won't hear that. 421 00:11:23,720 --> 00:11:26,720 So you have to communicate to them in some other method. 422 00:11:26,720 --> 00:11:30,720 And if it can be kept on the net, I think that's perfectly civilized. 423 00:11:30,720 --> 00:11:33,720 Hopefully, that's where it will stay. 424 00:11:33,720 --> 00:11:36,720 Why don't they just spam public places like Usenet? 425 00:11:36,720 --> 00:11:37,720 Well, they do. 426 00:11:37,720 --> 00:11:44,720 People, yeah, well, it used to be, you know, that used to happen a lot more often than it did in email, 427 00:11:44,720 --> 00:11:45,720 at least from my perspective. 428 00:11:45,720 --> 00:11:51,720 Every so often, I would be reading a news group, and I'd see a message come across that had nothing to do with the news group. 429 00:11:51,720 --> 00:11:56,720 And obviously, you know, that was some moron who was just spamming every single solitary news group. 430 00:11:56,720 --> 00:11:57,720 You saw his address. 431 00:11:57,720 --> 00:11:58,720 Right. 432 00:11:58,720 --> 00:12:02,720 Everybody replied to it to tell the person what a doofus he was in the first place for doing that. 433 00:12:02,720 --> 00:12:06,720 And basically, you know, he slunk away and formed a new identity and did it all over again. 434 00:12:06,720 --> 00:12:07,720 But that's just how it works. 435 00:12:07,720 --> 00:12:08,720 Right. 436 00:12:08,720 --> 00:12:12,720 But now it's become all too easy for these same people to do email spamming. 437 00:12:12,720 --> 00:12:13,720 Yeah. 438 00:12:13,720 --> 00:12:14,720 We don't even know that these are people. 439 00:12:14,720 --> 00:12:20,720 I mean, these are dedicated machines devoted to annoying us over and over and over again. 440 00:12:20,720 --> 00:12:21,720 I don't know. 441 00:12:21,720 --> 00:12:22,720 I feel pretty helpless and powerless. 442 00:12:22,720 --> 00:12:24,720 I think it's nothing I can do. 443 00:12:24,720 --> 00:12:31,720 It's every system administrator's responsibility to disable mail relaying on their mail server. 444 00:12:31,720 --> 00:12:32,720 Absolutely. 445 00:12:32,720 --> 00:12:38,720 Every single system administrator who is not running a mail server for the purpose of relaying mail. 446 00:12:38,720 --> 00:12:40,720 Well, okay, what's the concept of mail relaying? 447 00:12:40,720 --> 00:12:41,720 Very briefly. 448 00:12:41,720 --> 00:12:42,720 Okay, briefly. 449 00:12:42,720 --> 00:12:48,720 If you're running a mail host, and say you have multiple domains, you have people calling in from all different places, 450 00:12:48,720 --> 00:12:56,720 and you host a variety of domains, you're going to think that the easiest thing to do is, 451 00:12:56,720 --> 00:13:02,720 okay, I'm just going to allow my SendMail, for example, to relay all mail. 452 00:13:02,720 --> 00:13:07,720 That is, if the destination of the email message isn't on the system that the actual mail host is, 453 00:13:07,720 --> 00:13:09,720 then the mail can be relayed to another site. 454 00:13:09,720 --> 00:13:15,720 Well, when you install SendMail, by default, it will forward on any mail to anywhere. 455 00:13:15,720 --> 00:13:21,720 So, in essence, any mail host is a mail relayer, unless you take the steps to disable that. 456 00:13:21,720 --> 00:13:25,720 Now, what possible good reason is there to have this enabled? 457 00:13:25,720 --> 00:13:28,720 Nowadays, there is absolutely no good reason. 458 00:13:28,720 --> 00:13:29,720 Okay, back in the old days. 459 00:13:29,720 --> 00:13:37,720 Back in the old days, we wanted to encourage people to use email, so that if you didn't really know, 460 00:13:37,720 --> 00:13:44,720 let's say, for example, you have access to some crappy machine that has email access, 461 00:13:44,720 --> 00:13:49,720 provides you with email access, but it doesn't really know how to route email everywhere in the world. 462 00:13:49,720 --> 00:13:55,720 Well, just by crafting your email address, you can direct where the mail is going to go, 463 00:13:55,720 --> 00:14:01,720 so that you can tell it to go to a major relay host that will know how to deliver that mail anywhere in the world. 464 00:14:01,720 --> 00:14:05,720 You are actually in control of your email routing, which you still are. 465 00:14:05,720 --> 00:14:10,720 But if everyone goes and has to disable the fact that their SendMail will relay mail, 466 00:14:10,720 --> 00:14:11,720 then that won't be true anymore. 467 00:14:11,720 --> 00:14:13,720 But it isn't really necessary anymore. 468 00:14:13,720 --> 00:14:16,720 And I think it's just a remnant of a bygone era. 469 00:14:16,720 --> 00:14:21,720 Now, all mail hosts know how to deliver mail everywhere, so it isn't really necessary. 470 00:14:21,720 --> 00:14:23,720 I guess that default will be changing pretty soon. 471 00:14:23,720 --> 00:14:29,720 I hope so. Right now, if you go to www.sendmail.org, right on the first page, 472 00:14:29,720 --> 00:14:33,720 there are instructions for administrators how to modify the SendMail rules, 473 00:14:33,720 --> 00:14:37,720 so that you will disable relaying of mail. 474 00:14:37,720 --> 00:14:42,720 And I guess that's becoming increasingly necessary with all these morons out there that are bombarding us. 475 00:14:42,720 --> 00:14:48,720 I was thinking, though, one of the main things that I guess these people really hate is to have their privacy invaded. 476 00:14:48,720 --> 00:14:55,720 If you find out who is responsible, an individual that is responsible for sending out hundreds of thousands of these things 477 00:14:55,720 --> 00:15:03,720 to unwilling receivers, I guess giving that information out is probably about the best thing you can do. 478 00:15:03,720 --> 00:15:05,720 Maybe that will stop it once and for all. 479 00:15:05,720 --> 00:15:10,720 If you know a person that is doing this, then I don't know how to find out that information. 480 00:15:10,720 --> 00:15:14,720 There's an elaborate amount of tracing mail and figuring things out that way. 481 00:15:14,720 --> 00:15:18,720 But if enough people do it, we'll get an answer somehow. 482 00:15:18,720 --> 00:15:23,720 So, yeah, this is something I guess we'll be seeing this get to be more of a problem as the years go on. 483 00:15:23,720 --> 00:15:26,720 It's always been a slight problem, but I've really noticed it. 484 00:15:26,720 --> 00:15:28,720 Especially when I got the mail last week saying, 485 00:15:28,720 --> 00:15:34,720 you can have five million pieces of email addresses or whatever, so you can do this too. 486 00:15:34,720 --> 00:15:38,720 That was just too much, because obviously these people don't want to be mailed, 487 00:15:38,720 --> 00:15:40,720 yet you're giving out their private information. 488 00:15:40,720 --> 00:15:43,720 It's not really private information. I mean, it is an email address. 489 00:15:43,720 --> 00:15:49,720 But still, you're invading their privacy by bombarding them with junk that they obviously do not want. 490 00:15:49,720 --> 00:15:51,720 I mean, I don't know what the... 491 00:15:51,720 --> 00:15:55,720 With U.S. mail, you can tell them to stop sending you mail. 492 00:15:55,720 --> 00:15:59,720 Here, you can't, because they're not telling you who they are. 493 00:15:59,720 --> 00:16:00,720 So that's... 494 00:16:00,720 --> 00:16:04,720 Well, to me, the way it's like is, say, for example, you live in an apartment building, 495 00:16:04,720 --> 00:16:08,720 and somebody's delivering food to another apartment in your building. 496 00:16:08,720 --> 00:16:09,720 Right. 497 00:16:09,720 --> 00:16:12,720 And while they're in your building, now that they've gained access to your building, 498 00:16:12,720 --> 00:16:16,720 they're sticking menus under everyone's door. 499 00:16:16,720 --> 00:16:18,720 And let's just say that they're doing this... 500 00:16:18,720 --> 00:16:20,720 That's a problem in your building, isn't it? 501 00:16:20,720 --> 00:16:21,720 Yeah. 502 00:16:21,720 --> 00:16:22,720 How did I guess? 503 00:16:22,720 --> 00:16:25,720 Let's say that this happens half a dozen times every day. 504 00:16:25,720 --> 00:16:26,720 That could get really irritating. 505 00:16:26,720 --> 00:16:27,720 Yes. 506 00:16:27,720 --> 00:16:30,720 Well, that's what it's like if you get mail bombed every single day. 507 00:16:30,720 --> 00:16:32,720 To me, that's how it feels. 508 00:16:32,720 --> 00:16:35,720 For all you New York tenants out there that are listening to this, 509 00:16:35,720 --> 00:16:37,720 that's what it's like. 510 00:16:37,720 --> 00:16:38,720 Keep it in mind. 511 00:16:48,720 --> 00:16:53,720 And this week on Off The Hook, we have a guest with us. 512 00:16:53,720 --> 00:16:56,720 All the way up from Boston, Massachusetts, 513 00:16:56,720 --> 00:16:59,720 we have someone from an organization known as The Loft. 514 00:16:59,720 --> 00:17:01,720 Just to let you know what kind of mischief these guys are up to, 515 00:17:01,720 --> 00:17:05,720 here's a story that I got mailed to me about 50 times in my mailbox. 516 00:17:05,720 --> 00:17:06,720 Yeah, I did too. 517 00:17:06,720 --> 00:17:08,720 I don't know how this happens either. 518 00:17:08,720 --> 00:17:13,720 I mean, sometimes it's interesting stuff because you can actually read it, 519 00:17:13,720 --> 00:17:15,720 and it's got something to do with your life. 520 00:17:15,720 --> 00:17:17,720 So I don't mind getting it that many times over. 521 00:17:17,720 --> 00:17:19,720 I can just delete all the duplicates and keep one of them. 522 00:17:19,720 --> 00:17:21,720 But anyway, let's get to the story. 523 00:17:21,720 --> 00:17:25,720 A group of Boston-based sophisticated computer hackers called The Loft, 524 00:17:26,720 --> 00:17:28,720 pronounced loft because it's not spelled that way. 525 00:17:28,720 --> 00:17:30,720 It's spelled L-0-P-H-T. 526 00:17:30,720 --> 00:17:32,720 And I guess I would confuse a lot of people 527 00:17:32,720 --> 00:17:34,720 if they didn't tell you how it was pronounced. 528 00:17:34,720 --> 00:17:40,720 Anyway, they're continuing the assault of Microsoft's Windows NT operating system. 529 00:17:40,720 --> 00:17:43,720 The Loft has made available for download via their website 530 00:17:43,720 --> 00:17:48,720 an entire, with other publicly available programs, that is, 531 00:17:48,720 --> 00:17:51,720 that they claim can be used to steal the entire registry of passwords 532 00:17:51,720 --> 00:17:54,720 off a Windows NT network. 533 00:17:54,720 --> 00:17:58,720 That's according to CMP Media's EETimes Online. 534 00:17:58,720 --> 00:18:02,720 If you have an NT network and you have that network connected to the Internet, 535 00:18:02,720 --> 00:18:08,720 you're in deep trouble, says Mudge, co-author of the program Loft Crack, 536 00:18:08,720 --> 00:18:11,720 and also an encryption expert. 537 00:18:11,720 --> 00:18:15,720 Microsoft officials contacted by EETimes Online last week 538 00:18:15,720 --> 00:18:18,720 said they were not familiar enough with Loft Crack to comment specifically 539 00:18:18,720 --> 00:18:23,720 on the more serious threat to Microsoft's flagship network operating system 540 00:18:23,720 --> 00:18:26,720 and other hacks that have come to light in recent weeks 541 00:18:26,720 --> 00:18:31,720 because it employs a spreadsheet-like interface that is far easier to use. 542 00:18:31,720 --> 00:18:33,720 You know, I think this thing is printed off the column again 543 00:18:33,720 --> 00:18:35,720 because that sentence didn't make any sense. 544 00:18:35,720 --> 00:18:37,720 So let's just do this. 545 00:18:37,720 --> 00:18:39,720 Let's bring Mudge on. Mudge, are you there? 546 00:18:39,720 --> 00:18:40,720 Yes, I'm here. 547 00:18:40,720 --> 00:18:41,720 How are you doing? 548 00:18:41,720 --> 00:18:42,720 All right. How are you guys? 549 00:18:42,720 --> 00:18:45,720 Okay. So now, how true is this story that we read part of 550 00:18:45,720 --> 00:18:49,720 as far as you guys taking down Microsoft and causing them terror? 551 00:18:49,720 --> 00:18:52,720 Well, like any media article, there's a couple grains of truth in there. 552 00:18:52,720 --> 00:18:57,720 And there's a couple places where the author botched some of the information 553 00:18:57,720 --> 00:18:59,720 and seemed to have a couple notions of his own. 554 00:18:59,720 --> 00:19:02,720 You know, what are you going to do? 555 00:19:02,720 --> 00:19:04,720 Yeah, well, you tell people about it. That's the main thing to do. 556 00:19:04,720 --> 00:19:05,720 Yes, you do. 557 00:19:05,720 --> 00:19:08,720 Well, you want to start going through and debunking this thing right now? 558 00:19:08,720 --> 00:19:10,720 Well, let's start with what you guys did. 559 00:19:10,720 --> 00:19:12,720 Now, you have this program called Loft Crack. 560 00:19:12,720 --> 00:19:14,720 What does it do? 561 00:19:14,720 --> 00:19:16,720 Well, a while back, a person named Jeremy Allison, 562 00:19:16,720 --> 00:19:18,720 who works for Cygnus Software, 563 00:19:18,720 --> 00:19:20,720 came out with a program called PWDump. 564 00:19:20,720 --> 00:19:23,720 And what that does is it deobfuscates, 565 00:19:23,720 --> 00:19:26,720 basically Microsoft had kind of hidden the way it stores its username and passwords 566 00:19:26,720 --> 00:19:28,720 in their registry, 567 00:19:28,720 --> 00:19:31,720 so that it could be used with a public domain tool called Samba, 568 00:19:31,720 --> 00:19:35,720 which is a tool that is used to let Unix systems and NT systems 569 00:19:35,720 --> 00:19:38,720 share files back and forth between each other. 570 00:19:38,720 --> 00:19:40,720 Once he came out with the program, 571 00:19:40,720 --> 00:19:43,720 the same day we wrote the initial Loft Crack, 572 00:19:43,720 --> 00:19:47,720 and it takes the password, the user password file, 573 00:19:47,720 --> 00:19:49,720 and its encrypted form, 574 00:19:49,720 --> 00:19:52,720 and runs through various and sundry mechanisms 575 00:19:52,720 --> 00:19:56,720 to hand back the actual user's passwords. 576 00:19:56,720 --> 00:20:00,720 We have a couple of unique and novel things that we had done in there, 577 00:20:00,720 --> 00:20:03,720 such as brute forcing through the entire key space, 578 00:20:03,720 --> 00:20:05,720 which for a while Microsoft was saying, 579 00:20:05,720 --> 00:20:07,720 well, gee, you really need to choose. 580 00:20:07,720 --> 00:20:08,720 This is not common sense. 581 00:20:08,720 --> 00:20:09,720 Good passwords. 582 00:20:09,720 --> 00:20:10,720 Don't choose cat. 583 00:20:10,720 --> 00:20:11,720 Don't choose dog. 584 00:20:11,720 --> 00:20:14,720 Don't choose love, sex, secret, god, money, system. 585 00:20:14,720 --> 00:20:15,720 Or if you're over in Europe, 586 00:20:15,720 --> 00:20:17,720 Fred seems to be the most common one. 587 00:20:17,720 --> 00:20:18,720 Okay, they saw the film, so they know. 588 00:20:18,720 --> 00:20:21,720 Exactly. 589 00:20:21,720 --> 00:20:24,720 And this kind of negates that to the point of saying, 590 00:20:24,720 --> 00:20:26,720 well, don't choose any password under 14 characters, 591 00:20:26,720 --> 00:20:32,720 even if it's a 7'5 pound bang star, yada, yada, yada. 592 00:20:32,720 --> 00:20:34,720 This was the initial one. 593 00:20:34,720 --> 00:20:36,720 We had actually called up the people who wrote NT Crack 594 00:20:36,720 --> 00:20:39,720 before they had come out with it and explained how we were doing it, 595 00:20:39,720 --> 00:20:41,720 which, much to our chagrin, 596 00:20:41,720 --> 00:20:44,720 turned around and came out with one a couple days later 597 00:20:44,720 --> 00:20:46,720 before we released ours, which is great, 598 00:20:46,720 --> 00:20:47,720 because you need more of them out there, 599 00:20:47,720 --> 00:20:52,720 different people taking different views and approaches to things. 600 00:20:52,720 --> 00:20:56,720 The initial version that went out, one of the notable things, 601 00:20:56,720 --> 00:20:57,720 which I guess made most of the press, 602 00:20:57,720 --> 00:20:59,720 was the fact that it had a nice GUI, 603 00:20:59,720 --> 00:21:03,720 graphical user interface, to point and click. 604 00:21:03,720 --> 00:21:05,720 Nobody's excited about, well, gee, 605 00:21:05,720 --> 00:21:08,720 Microsoft only does one round of DES encryption as opposed to 24. 606 00:21:08,720 --> 00:21:10,720 Gee, they have no salts. 607 00:21:10,720 --> 00:21:12,720 They have this horrible landman protocol. 608 00:21:12,720 --> 00:21:15,720 They're like, ooh, nice point and click interface. 609 00:21:15,720 --> 00:21:17,720 Anybody can use this. 610 00:21:17,720 --> 00:21:22,720 So I think that's the reason it's getting a lot of the press, 611 00:21:22,720 --> 00:21:23,720 which is a good thing. 612 00:21:23,720 --> 00:21:25,720 If you've got to figure out how the press plays their game, 613 00:21:25,720 --> 00:21:27,720 if you want to expose an underlying problem, 614 00:21:27,720 --> 00:21:30,720 maybe you have to candy-coat it and present it in a nice package to them. 615 00:21:30,720 --> 00:21:33,720 It's kind of sad to realize that's the way it works. 616 00:21:33,720 --> 00:21:35,720 I think we can pretty much predict 617 00:21:35,720 --> 00:21:37,720 how the press is going to react to something like this. 618 00:21:37,720 --> 00:21:38,720 They're going to get most of the facts wrong, 619 00:21:38,720 --> 00:21:40,720 and they're going to rely on panicking. 620 00:21:40,720 --> 00:21:43,720 But how is Microsoft reacting? 621 00:21:43,720 --> 00:21:44,720 Well, the funny thing, 622 00:21:44,720 --> 00:21:47,720 the one line Microsoft officials contacted last week 623 00:21:47,720 --> 00:21:49,720 said they were not familiar enough with Lost Crack 624 00:21:49,720 --> 00:21:50,720 to comment specifically about it. 625 00:21:50,720 --> 00:21:52,720 I find that rather funny. 626 00:21:52,720 --> 00:21:54,720 I talked to one of their head marketing people, 627 00:21:54,720 --> 00:21:56,720 and his big comment was, well, gee, 628 00:21:56,720 --> 00:21:58,720 if you can brute force all of our passwords 629 00:21:58,720 --> 00:22:01,720 in a matter of two, three days, let's say, 630 00:22:01,720 --> 00:22:03,720 why can't you find something more productive 631 00:22:03,720 --> 00:22:06,720 to do with those two, three days' worth of time? 632 00:22:06,720 --> 00:22:08,720 Of course, the response is, well, the computer's doing it. 633 00:22:08,720 --> 00:22:11,720 I told it to run it, and I am doing more productive things. 634 00:22:11,720 --> 00:22:12,720 Uh-huh. 635 00:22:12,720 --> 00:22:14,720 That's amazing. 636 00:22:14,720 --> 00:22:16,720 So is that really the only... 637 00:22:16,720 --> 00:22:19,720 you haven't gotten any kind of legal threats or anything like that? 638 00:22:19,720 --> 00:22:21,720 No, we haven't gotten any legal threats. 639 00:22:21,720 --> 00:22:24,720 I don't think we presented it the way... 640 00:22:24,720 --> 00:22:27,720 well, from our advisories and our information on it, 641 00:22:27,720 --> 00:22:29,720 which is if you grab the package off of the loft, 642 00:22:29,720 --> 00:22:31,720 all is there. 643 00:22:31,720 --> 00:22:34,720 We tried to present it in a very nice fashion, 644 00:22:34,720 --> 00:22:36,720 saying, look, this is a problem. 645 00:22:36,720 --> 00:22:39,720 Here are a couple of purported solutions, 646 00:22:39,720 --> 00:22:42,720 and we really need the public to be more aware 647 00:22:42,720 --> 00:22:45,720 of what Microsoft's doing and what Microsoft's doing. 648 00:22:45,720 --> 00:22:48,720 If they're pandering relatively crappy solutions 649 00:22:48,720 --> 00:22:52,720 and saying they're secure because, quote, they're secure. 650 00:22:52,720 --> 00:22:56,720 And the average Joe user who's using it at work 651 00:22:56,720 --> 00:22:58,720 or using it at home 652 00:22:58,720 --> 00:23:00,720 might not necessarily have the technical expertise 653 00:23:00,720 --> 00:23:03,720 or the tools or the resources to actually go in 654 00:23:03,720 --> 00:23:06,720 and say, well, gee, what's this thing really doing? 655 00:23:06,720 --> 00:23:10,720 You know, that's a large part of the loft's main directive. 656 00:23:10,720 --> 00:23:12,720 Uh-huh. And what kinds of things have you done in the past 657 00:23:12,720 --> 00:23:14,720 that also followed that? 658 00:23:14,720 --> 00:23:18,720 We ripped apart SKEY, which is a one-time password algorithm 659 00:23:18,720 --> 00:23:20,720 developed by Belcor. 660 00:23:20,720 --> 00:23:23,720 We found flaws in Kerberos 4, 661 00:23:23,720 --> 00:23:25,720 which was developed out of MIT. 662 00:23:25,720 --> 00:23:27,720 We've done numerous attacks 663 00:23:27,720 --> 00:23:31,720 on the Sun Microsystems operating systems. 664 00:23:31,720 --> 00:23:33,720 We've done some hardware projects 665 00:23:33,720 --> 00:23:35,720 such as POCSEG decoder kits, 666 00:23:35,720 --> 00:23:38,720 which allow you to listen to people's pages 667 00:23:38,720 --> 00:23:40,720 going across to their beepers 668 00:23:40,720 --> 00:23:42,720 much in the same fashion that you could 669 00:23:42,720 --> 00:23:44,720 tune into cellular frequencies 670 00:23:44,720 --> 00:23:47,720 on a wideband transceiver scanner 671 00:23:47,720 --> 00:23:50,720 and listen to those. 672 00:23:50,720 --> 00:23:52,720 Other things that we've done. 673 00:23:52,720 --> 00:23:55,720 We created mischief many years ago. 674 00:23:55,720 --> 00:23:57,720 We found that we don't necessarily have the time 675 00:23:57,720 --> 00:23:59,720 to take the beatings from some of that, 676 00:23:59,720 --> 00:24:02,720 create our own mischief internally on our own systems now 677 00:24:02,720 --> 00:24:06,720 and try and basically post the outcomes, the results 678 00:24:06,720 --> 00:24:09,720 to the general populace so that they can consume it 679 00:24:09,720 --> 00:24:12,720 and hopefully open up and look at things in a new perspective. 680 00:24:12,720 --> 00:24:14,720 Well, how does the general populace react? 681 00:24:14,720 --> 00:24:17,720 I mean, how do you get feedback from the general populace anyway? 682 00:24:17,720 --> 00:24:20,720 Well, we release our exploits, if you will, 683 00:24:20,720 --> 00:24:22,720 on different mailing lists. 684 00:24:22,720 --> 00:24:25,720 We don't do much in the way of actual printed form. 685 00:24:25,720 --> 00:24:27,720 We do it through our web page, 686 00:24:27,720 --> 00:24:30,720 generally getting about 50,000 hits a day. 687 00:24:30,720 --> 00:24:35,720 And the general populace has been really happy for the most part. 688 00:24:35,720 --> 00:24:38,720 Once in a while you get some people who are just upset 689 00:24:38,720 --> 00:24:40,720 and think we're nothing but troublemakers, 690 00:24:40,720 --> 00:24:43,720 but they're relatively few and far between, 691 00:24:43,720 --> 00:24:45,720 which we're really happy to say 692 00:24:45,720 --> 00:24:47,720 because we always try and come out with solutions 693 00:24:47,720 --> 00:24:49,720 or if nothing else to say, 694 00:24:49,720 --> 00:24:53,720 look, this is a coding mistake done in the way they developed this program 695 00:24:53,720 --> 00:24:56,720 and hopefully other people doing development work 696 00:24:56,720 --> 00:24:59,720 will say, oh, geez, I was going to do that in my program here. 697 00:24:59,720 --> 00:25:01,720 Now with this explanation and this example 698 00:25:01,720 --> 00:25:04,720 and a proof of concept showing why it's a problem, 699 00:25:04,720 --> 00:25:07,720 because without a proof of concept showing it's a problem, 700 00:25:07,720 --> 00:25:09,720 people will just brush over it. 701 00:25:09,720 --> 00:25:11,720 Hopefully they'll improve their software 702 00:25:11,720 --> 00:25:13,720 and everybody will have a better product. 703 00:25:13,720 --> 00:25:16,720 So how would you compare yourself to an organization like CERT, for instance? 704 00:25:16,720 --> 00:25:18,720 Oh. 705 00:25:18,720 --> 00:25:20,720 Without using any profanity. 706 00:25:20,720 --> 00:25:22,720 Oh, thank you. 707 00:25:22,720 --> 00:25:25,720 Well, A, we don't make any money off this. 708 00:25:25,720 --> 00:25:28,720 CERT being originally a government-funded organization, 709 00:25:28,720 --> 00:25:32,720 which now seems to be entirely funded by the private sector 710 00:25:32,720 --> 00:25:34,720 and in it for the money. 711 00:25:34,720 --> 00:25:36,720 We give credit where credit's due. 712 00:25:36,720 --> 00:25:39,720 If we based our work off of somebody else's work, 713 00:25:39,720 --> 00:25:41,720 we're right up front with it, 714 00:25:41,720 --> 00:25:44,720 and we try and give it to people in a timely fashion, 715 00:25:44,720 --> 00:25:47,720 none of which are things that CERT seems to do. 716 00:25:47,720 --> 00:25:51,720 CERT is a bit of an old boys network, 717 00:25:51,720 --> 00:25:53,720 and it's internal. 718 00:25:53,720 --> 00:25:57,720 And a couple of things that they have really hinder them in their work. 719 00:25:57,720 --> 00:26:00,720 One, they have such a huge name recognition 720 00:26:00,720 --> 00:26:02,720 that they get people on board, 721 00:26:02,720 --> 00:26:04,720 and within a matter of a week, 722 00:26:04,720 --> 00:26:06,720 having no previous experience in the field, 723 00:26:06,720 --> 00:26:10,720 they're labeling themselves as experts in the industry. 724 00:26:10,720 --> 00:26:13,720 The other thing is that they have a policy 725 00:26:13,720 --> 00:26:17,720 where if a problem is found in a piece of software 726 00:26:17,720 --> 00:26:21,720 or a piece of code or something that's on the Internet, 727 00:26:21,720 --> 00:26:23,720 that could put a lot of people at risk. 728 00:26:23,720 --> 00:26:25,720 Say, for instance, an operating system 729 00:26:25,720 --> 00:26:28,720 that's holding all of your financial data. 730 00:26:28,720 --> 00:26:30,720 They will not go public with it 731 00:26:30,720 --> 00:26:33,720 until they've contacted that company, 732 00:26:33,720 --> 00:26:35,720 which is a good thing, 733 00:26:35,720 --> 00:26:38,720 and contacted all the other companies that they think it's affected, 734 00:26:38,720 --> 00:26:40,720 and then all the other companies have come back 735 00:26:40,720 --> 00:26:43,720 and said either we have a fix or we don't have a fix. 736 00:26:43,720 --> 00:26:45,720 Now, here's a really interesting thing to do 737 00:26:45,720 --> 00:26:47,720 if somebody has a lot of spare time on their hands. 738 00:26:47,720 --> 00:26:51,720 We were thinking actually about releasing a loft advisory on cert advisories. 739 00:26:51,720 --> 00:26:53,720 You can go through the cert advisories 740 00:26:53,720 --> 00:26:56,720 and find the standard companies that they list 741 00:26:56,720 --> 00:26:57,720 that they've been working with, 742 00:26:57,720 --> 00:27:00,720 such as Harris Computing, Sun Microsystems. 743 00:27:00,720 --> 00:27:02,720 You'll definitely find a lot of older 744 00:27:02,720 --> 00:27:06,720 Department of Defense groups working with them. 745 00:27:06,720 --> 00:27:10,720 They will only mention the company in an advisory 746 00:27:10,720 --> 00:27:12,720 if that company is not vulnerable 747 00:27:12,720 --> 00:27:15,720 or if they were vulnerable and already have a fix in place. 748 00:27:15,720 --> 00:27:18,720 If the company is vulnerable and either refuses to fix it 749 00:27:18,720 --> 00:27:21,720 or doesn't have a fix for it at the time, 750 00:27:21,720 --> 00:27:23,720 they will leave them absent. 751 00:27:23,720 --> 00:27:26,720 It is quite apparent through a little traffic analysis 752 00:27:26,720 --> 00:27:28,720 in what names you see 753 00:27:28,720 --> 00:27:30,720 and all of a sudden somebody's notably absent 754 00:27:30,720 --> 00:27:32,720 that this person is still vulnerable. 755 00:27:32,720 --> 00:27:34,720 Wow, you're right. 756 00:27:34,720 --> 00:27:36,720 You see one advisory and then the next one 757 00:27:36,720 --> 00:27:38,720 suddenly doesn't have this name. 758 00:27:38,720 --> 00:27:42,720 Yeah, it lists Sun and Apple and Next and SGI 759 00:27:42,720 --> 00:27:47,720 and the next one lists Sun and Apple and Next and that's it. 760 00:27:47,720 --> 00:27:50,720 You realize, gee, that was the printing subsystem 761 00:27:50,720 --> 00:27:53,720 and they're all based off the same printing subsystem. 762 00:27:53,720 --> 00:27:57,720 They weren't listed either as not vulnerable or vulnerable 763 00:27:57,720 --> 00:27:58,720 and here's the fix. 764 00:27:58,720 --> 00:28:01,720 So cert will let this go on for an unlimited amount of time? 765 00:28:01,720 --> 00:28:02,720 Yes. 766 00:28:02,720 --> 00:28:03,720 How about you guys? 767 00:28:03,720 --> 00:28:05,720 Do you give any lead time whatsoever? 768 00:28:05,720 --> 00:28:07,720 It depends on what it is. 769 00:28:07,720 --> 00:28:09,720 For instance, the Kerberos advisory, 770 00:28:09,720 --> 00:28:11,720 we found that if we give them a lot of lead time, 771 00:28:11,720 --> 00:28:13,720 they don't do anything about it. 772 00:28:13,720 --> 00:28:15,720 So we've approached companies like Security Dynamics 773 00:28:15,720 --> 00:28:17,720 who makes the secure ID card. 774 00:28:17,720 --> 00:28:20,720 We've approached Cygnus 775 00:28:20,720 --> 00:28:22,720 who is the current maintainers of the Kerberos 776 00:28:22,720 --> 00:28:25,720 crypto and authentication system. 777 00:28:25,720 --> 00:28:29,720 And a lot of times it seems that if you say, 778 00:28:29,720 --> 00:28:30,720 here's a problem, 779 00:28:30,720 --> 00:28:32,720 they'll come back and say, who knows about this? 780 00:28:32,720 --> 00:28:35,720 And you're like, well, us and potentially other hackers, 781 00:28:36,720 --> 00:28:39,720 anybody else who spent the time to go looking for it. 782 00:28:39,720 --> 00:28:40,720 Like, oh, that's it? 783 00:28:40,720 --> 00:28:41,720 Well, yeah, okay. 784 00:28:41,720 --> 00:28:42,720 Thanks a lot for the info. 785 00:28:42,720 --> 00:28:43,720 We'll look into it. 786 00:28:43,720 --> 00:28:44,720 That's it. 787 00:28:44,720 --> 00:28:45,720 End of story. 788 00:28:45,720 --> 00:28:47,720 If their customers, 789 00:28:47,720 --> 00:28:48,720 where they're getting their money from, 790 00:28:48,720 --> 00:28:51,720 aren't bitching and moaning and complaining about it, 791 00:28:51,720 --> 00:28:54,720 then it's not worth, in their eyes, 792 00:28:54,720 --> 00:28:56,720 their time to pull their top developers 793 00:28:56,720 --> 00:28:58,720 off of whatever project they are, 794 00:28:58,720 --> 00:29:00,720 adding new bells and whistles to their software 795 00:29:00,720 --> 00:29:02,720 to go in and clean up the problems. 796 00:29:03,720 --> 00:29:04,720 In reality, all they're doing 797 00:29:04,720 --> 00:29:06,720 is keeping their customers in the dark 798 00:29:06,720 --> 00:29:08,720 and keeping them vulnerable 799 00:29:08,720 --> 00:29:10,720 to the people who know the problems, 800 00:29:10,720 --> 00:29:11,720 which are the hackers, 801 00:29:11,720 --> 00:29:13,720 which are the people rummaging through their systems 802 00:29:13,720 --> 00:29:15,720 with impunity at that point. 803 00:29:15,720 --> 00:29:18,720 They keep their software dumb intentionally 804 00:29:18,720 --> 00:29:21,720 in the name of the all-powerful dollar. 805 00:29:21,720 --> 00:29:23,720 So once they do that, what's your reaction? 806 00:29:23,720 --> 00:29:24,720 Oh, we go public with it. 807 00:29:24,720 --> 00:29:26,720 I mean, how much time do you give them? 808 00:29:26,720 --> 00:29:27,720 48 hours a week? 809 00:29:27,720 --> 00:29:29,720 We played with security 810 00:29:29,720 --> 00:29:31,720 and we gave them about a year's lead time. 811 00:29:31,720 --> 00:29:32,720 Really? 812 00:29:32,720 --> 00:29:33,720 And they did absolutely nothing. 813 00:29:33,720 --> 00:29:35,720 So we ended up helping do some work 814 00:29:35,720 --> 00:29:38,720 on a paper that was released publicly out of Canada. 815 00:29:38,720 --> 00:29:39,720 Uh-huh. 816 00:29:39,720 --> 00:29:40,720 We were a bit nervous 817 00:29:40,720 --> 00:29:42,720 because they seemed that they really wanted 818 00:29:42,720 --> 00:29:43,720 to play hardball for a while. 819 00:29:43,720 --> 00:29:45,720 Meaning legally, they wanted to come out on you? 820 00:29:45,720 --> 00:29:46,720 Yeah. 821 00:29:46,720 --> 00:29:49,720 They seemed to be of the ilk where, 822 00:29:49,720 --> 00:29:51,720 and great, I'll probably be getting a call 823 00:29:51,720 --> 00:29:52,720 from their lawyers saying, 824 00:29:52,720 --> 00:29:53,720 that's some slander. 825 00:29:53,720 --> 00:29:54,720 Yes. 826 00:29:54,720 --> 00:29:56,720 In my opinion, 827 00:29:56,720 --> 00:29:58,720 or how it appeared to be, 828 00:29:58,720 --> 00:30:01,720 was that they were more than happy 829 00:30:01,720 --> 00:30:03,720 to try and keep track of us for a while. 830 00:30:03,720 --> 00:30:06,720 We kept trying to get them to change things. 831 00:30:06,720 --> 00:30:08,720 And after they were able to say, 832 00:30:08,720 --> 00:30:10,720 okay, this is over X amount of dollars, 833 00:30:10,720 --> 00:30:13,720 $500,000 worth of our money, 834 00:30:13,720 --> 00:30:14,720 just to try and keep track of it, 835 00:30:14,720 --> 00:30:15,720 try and do damage control 836 00:30:15,720 --> 00:30:17,720 on some of the questions you were asking, 837 00:30:17,720 --> 00:30:19,720 we can hand this over to the feds now 838 00:30:19,720 --> 00:30:21,720 because it's a federal incident. 839 00:30:21,720 --> 00:30:22,720 Uh-huh. 840 00:30:22,720 --> 00:30:24,720 Because we're purporting this amount of monetary loss. 841 00:30:24,720 --> 00:30:26,720 We were like, well, 842 00:30:26,720 --> 00:30:28,720 all you had to do was spend the time, 843 00:30:28,720 --> 00:30:29,720 you know, 844 00:30:29,720 --> 00:30:31,720 take your developers off what they're doing 845 00:30:31,720 --> 00:30:32,720 for like a day or two, 846 00:30:32,720 --> 00:30:33,720 have them fix this stuff, 847 00:30:33,720 --> 00:30:34,720 and then you're offering your customers 848 00:30:34,720 --> 00:30:35,720 a much better solution. 849 00:30:35,720 --> 00:30:36,720 Aren't you actually doing them a favor 850 00:30:36,720 --> 00:30:37,720 by telling them this? 851 00:30:37,720 --> 00:30:39,720 Yeah, we're doing them probably, 852 00:30:39,720 --> 00:30:40,720 you know, 853 00:30:40,720 --> 00:30:42,720 so much money's worth of free work 854 00:30:42,720 --> 00:30:44,720 that it's not even funny. 855 00:30:44,720 --> 00:30:46,720 You have seven people who are highly talented 856 00:30:46,720 --> 00:30:48,720 in computer security 857 00:30:48,720 --> 00:30:50,720 and operating system design 858 00:30:50,720 --> 00:30:52,720 and secure coding practices and hardware 859 00:30:52,720 --> 00:30:54,720 and, you know, you name it. 860 00:30:54,720 --> 00:30:58,720 And if a company actually had to pay somebody like that, 861 00:30:58,720 --> 00:31:00,720 you know, like we actually make this, 862 00:31:00,720 --> 00:31:01,720 you know, 863 00:31:01,720 --> 00:31:03,720 this would probably be, you know, 864 00:31:03,720 --> 00:31:05,720 a high five-digit to six-digit salaries each. 865 00:31:05,720 --> 00:31:06,720 Mm-hmm. 866 00:31:06,720 --> 00:31:08,720 Has any company ever thanked you 867 00:31:08,720 --> 00:31:10,720 for what you've done? 868 00:31:10,720 --> 00:31:11,720 Yeah, actually, 869 00:31:11,720 --> 00:31:13,720 one company was extremely cool about it, 870 00:31:13,720 --> 00:31:16,720 which was Lotus, of all companies. 871 00:31:16,720 --> 00:31:20,720 WeldPond found some problems in Lotus Domino. 872 00:31:20,720 --> 00:31:22,720 And this is the same one that I forget 873 00:31:22,720 --> 00:31:25,720 the comedian's name who does their advertisement, 874 00:31:25,720 --> 00:31:26,720 Dennis Leary, that's it, 875 00:31:26,720 --> 00:31:29,720 saying, oh, it's secure. 876 00:31:29,720 --> 00:31:31,720 So he said, well, it's not secure. 877 00:31:31,720 --> 00:31:32,720 Here's the post. 878 00:31:32,720 --> 00:31:34,720 Here's how to impersonate any other user 879 00:31:34,720 --> 00:31:36,720 where they say you can't be done. 880 00:31:36,720 --> 00:31:37,720 Here's how to remove people's documents 881 00:31:37,720 --> 00:31:39,720 without the authority to do it. 882 00:31:39,720 --> 00:31:42,720 And Lotus turned around the very next day, 883 00:31:42,720 --> 00:31:44,720 put up on their main Domino webpage 884 00:31:44,720 --> 00:31:46,720 a nice, you know, 885 00:31:46,720 --> 00:31:48,720 here's credit to where, you know, credits do. 886 00:31:48,720 --> 00:31:49,720 They did the research. 887 00:31:49,720 --> 00:31:50,720 They found the problem. 888 00:31:50,720 --> 00:31:52,720 And here's our fix. 889 00:31:52,720 --> 00:31:53,720 We loved that. 890 00:31:53,720 --> 00:31:55,720 You know, we were tickled pink. 891 00:31:55,720 --> 00:31:57,720 Usually we come out with something. 892 00:31:57,720 --> 00:31:58,720 You know, all the hackers say, 893 00:31:58,720 --> 00:32:00,720 oh, this is great, thanks, 894 00:32:00,720 --> 00:32:01,720 which, hey, that's fair game. 895 00:32:01,720 --> 00:32:03,720 Anybody knows it now. 896 00:32:03,720 --> 00:32:04,720 And the companies do nothing. 897 00:32:04,720 --> 00:32:06,720 They keep trying to spin their wheels 898 00:32:06,720 --> 00:32:08,720 so that, you know, they can make money 899 00:32:08,720 --> 00:32:09,720 and not have to worry about it, 900 00:32:09,720 --> 00:32:11,720 shove it under the carpet. 901 00:32:11,720 --> 00:32:13,720 And then some organization like CERT 902 00:32:13,720 --> 00:32:15,720 will come along, post an advisory about it 903 00:32:15,720 --> 00:32:17,720 two months later and take credit for it. 904 00:32:17,720 --> 00:32:18,720 Interesting. 905 00:32:18,720 --> 00:32:20,720 That is exactly how it works. 906 00:32:20,720 --> 00:32:23,720 I was speaking with Mudge from The Loft up in Boston 907 00:32:23,720 --> 00:32:27,720 about the latest, I guess, hack into Windows NT 908 00:32:27,720 --> 00:32:29,720 that's being misreported all over the place by the press 909 00:32:29,720 --> 00:32:33,720 and reacted to in various ways by Microsoft entities. 910 00:32:33,720 --> 00:32:35,720 FiberOptics here as well. 911 00:32:35,720 --> 00:32:38,720 And I think you had something to say about S-Key, right? 912 00:32:38,720 --> 00:32:42,720 Yeah, I was curious about what you think about the fact 913 00:32:42,720 --> 00:32:47,720 that we've more or less been forced into using 914 00:32:47,720 --> 00:32:49,720 the older version of S-Key, that it's sort of 915 00:32:49,720 --> 00:32:52,720 nobody really ever got a chance to vote, 916 00:32:52,720 --> 00:32:56,720 but everybody supports S-Key using MD4, 917 00:32:56,720 --> 00:33:00,720 Message Digest 4, instead of MD5 or something stronger. 918 00:33:00,720 --> 00:33:02,720 Yeah, the difference between MD4 and MD5, 919 00:33:02,720 --> 00:33:06,720 which are both one-way hash algorithms, 920 00:33:06,720 --> 00:33:09,720 meaning that you hand in input that generates 921 00:33:09,720 --> 00:33:12,720 a random output that you won't get 922 00:33:12,720 --> 00:33:14,720 by handing any other input in, 923 00:33:14,720 --> 00:33:16,720 the main difference seems to be that it is possible 924 00:33:16,720 --> 00:33:19,720 in extreme cases to create duplicate hashes 925 00:33:19,720 --> 00:33:22,720 with MD4 as opposed to MD5. 926 00:33:22,720 --> 00:33:26,720 The actual usefulness of this in ATT&CK is pretty minimal. 927 00:33:26,720 --> 00:33:28,720 The other thing is you can grab somebody like 928 00:33:28,720 --> 00:33:32,720 Bits of Oneima's log daemon utilities, which has S-Key, 929 00:33:32,720 --> 00:33:35,720 and you can compile in MD5 very easily. 930 00:33:35,720 --> 00:33:38,720 There are drop-in routines to put in place for it. 931 00:33:38,720 --> 00:33:41,720 What kind of chagrins me is the fact that 932 00:33:41,720 --> 00:33:45,720 Bellcore released S-Key publicly with a free version. 933 00:33:45,720 --> 00:33:48,720 Then later put some fixes in and handed it out 934 00:33:48,720 --> 00:33:53,720 as a commercial version and wouldn't let us. 935 00:33:53,720 --> 00:33:55,720 They approached us a while back saying, 936 00:33:55,720 --> 00:33:57,720 geez, you did a lot of hacking on S-Key, 937 00:33:57,720 --> 00:33:59,720 what do you think of the new version? 938 00:33:59,720 --> 00:34:02,720 I said, well, send us an example copy to play around with. 939 00:34:02,720 --> 00:34:04,720 They're like, well, you have to buy it. 940 00:34:04,720 --> 00:34:06,720 I don't think so. 941 00:34:06,720 --> 00:34:07,720 Wow. 942 00:34:07,720 --> 00:34:10,720 Just for the benefit of those people that I know 943 00:34:10,720 --> 00:34:13,720 are tearing their hair out in frustration, 944 00:34:13,720 --> 00:34:15,720 what is S-Key? Just very briefly. 945 00:34:15,720 --> 00:34:17,720 S-Key stands for, well, geez, 946 00:34:17,720 --> 00:34:19,720 I hope I remember what it stands for. 947 00:34:19,720 --> 00:34:22,720 Secure key or single key. 948 00:34:22,720 --> 00:34:25,720 What happens is normally if I want to log into a computer system, 949 00:34:25,720 --> 00:34:28,720 so I connect to that computer system and it says, 950 00:34:28,720 --> 00:34:30,720 what's your username? I say Mudge. 951 00:34:30,720 --> 00:34:33,720 It says, what's your password? I say Love or Sexers. 952 00:34:33,720 --> 00:34:34,720 You know the movie. 953 00:34:34,720 --> 00:34:35,720 Yeah, all the passwords we're allowed to use. 954 00:34:35,720 --> 00:34:37,720 Of course. 955 00:34:37,720 --> 00:34:40,720 Anybody who's sniffing on the wire, 956 00:34:40,720 --> 00:34:44,720 and sniffing on the wire is analogous to the old party line telephones 957 00:34:44,720 --> 00:34:46,720 where if you pick up the line and hear your neighbor talking, 958 00:34:46,720 --> 00:34:48,720 out of politeness you put it back down. 959 00:34:48,720 --> 00:34:49,720 Well, if you continue to listen, 960 00:34:49,720 --> 00:34:52,720 that's the same thing as sniffing on an Ethernet wire 961 00:34:52,720 --> 00:34:54,720 or sniffing on the network. 962 00:34:54,720 --> 00:34:58,720 In order to prevent you from using the same password over and over again, 963 00:34:58,720 --> 00:35:01,720 so that somebody sees it going by or hears it on the phone 964 00:35:01,720 --> 00:35:04,720 and they say, oh, I know his password is Love, 965 00:35:04,720 --> 00:35:06,720 so now I'm going to connect and say, oh, my name is Mudge 966 00:35:06,720 --> 00:35:08,720 and my password is Love. 967 00:35:08,720 --> 00:35:10,720 Ha, ha, ha, I'm into his system. 968 00:35:10,720 --> 00:35:12,720 What S-Key does is S-Key says, 969 00:35:12,720 --> 00:35:14,720 greetings, what's your username? Mudge. 970 00:35:14,720 --> 00:35:16,720 Okay, here's your challenge. 971 00:35:16,720 --> 00:35:17,720 And it hands you back a number. 972 00:35:17,720 --> 00:35:22,720 And you plug that number into a little piece of software called a calculator 973 00:35:22,720 --> 00:35:24,720 and it generates the response. 974 00:35:24,720 --> 00:35:27,720 And that number challenge that you get is different every time. 975 00:35:27,720 --> 00:35:30,720 So, although my password might be Love, 976 00:35:30,720 --> 00:35:32,720 I compute Love against, 977 00:35:32,720 --> 00:35:35,720 or the software computes Love against this challenge 978 00:35:35,720 --> 00:35:37,720 and gives me a unique response. 979 00:35:37,720 --> 00:35:39,720 So I type in that response 980 00:35:39,720 --> 00:35:41,720 and the person watching on the wire, 981 00:35:41,720 --> 00:35:42,720 if they get that response, 982 00:35:42,720 --> 00:35:48,720 which will be five non-sequitur terms like dog, boy, cat, bike, mountain, 983 00:35:48,720 --> 00:35:54,720 which, geez, I'd love a little Freudian analysis on this. 984 00:35:54,720 --> 00:35:58,720 You know, that's useless because it was only good that one time. 985 00:35:58,720 --> 00:36:01,720 If they try and connect in and say, ha, I'm going to pretend I'm Mudge. 986 00:36:01,720 --> 00:36:02,720 My name's Mudge. 987 00:36:02,720 --> 00:36:04,720 It's going to give them a different challenge. 988 00:36:04,720 --> 00:36:07,720 Once they know what my secret password was that I plugged into my calculator, 989 00:36:07,720 --> 00:36:10,720 they don't know what the response is supposed to be. 990 00:36:10,720 --> 00:36:12,720 I was curious, why is it always words? 991 00:36:12,720 --> 00:36:14,720 Why is it just random characters? 992 00:36:14,720 --> 00:36:16,720 I've always seen words whenever I've used this. 993 00:36:16,720 --> 00:36:18,720 Yeah, that's the way that they default set it up. 994 00:36:18,720 --> 00:36:20,720 You can build it in two different fashions, 995 00:36:20,720 --> 00:36:21,720 one where it gives you the words, 996 00:36:21,720 --> 00:36:25,720 one where it gives you the actual message digest hash, 997 00:36:25,720 --> 00:36:27,720 which is the pseudo-random string. 998 00:36:27,720 --> 00:36:31,720 The words are simply so that it's easier for you to type them in. 999 00:36:31,720 --> 00:36:37,720 If you had to type in 16 characters being A, E, 3, 7, 5, B, 1, 6, yada, yada, 1000 00:36:37,720 --> 00:36:42,720 or if you can type in five words, dog, boy, cat, etc., 1001 00:36:42,720 --> 00:36:45,720 you have much less of a chance of making a mistake typing it in. 1002 00:36:45,720 --> 00:36:47,720 I just figured most people were cutting and pasting, so it didn't really matter. 1003 00:36:47,720 --> 00:36:49,720 Yeah, exactly. 1004 00:36:49,720 --> 00:36:50,720 Okay, we're taking phone calls. 1005 00:36:50,720 --> 00:36:52,720 212-279-3400. 1006 00:36:52,720 --> 00:36:53,720 We have Mudge from the loft on. 1007 00:36:53,720 --> 00:36:54,720 I hope he can stay with us. 1008 00:36:54,720 --> 00:36:55,720 Oh, yeah. 1009 00:36:55,720 --> 00:36:56,720 Great, okay. 1010 00:36:56,720 --> 00:37:00,720 If you have any kinds of questions for him or about the organization, 1011 00:37:00,720 --> 00:37:02,720 what those people up in the loft are doing, 1012 00:37:02,720 --> 00:37:06,720 and are there other organizations that you know of that do similar things? 1013 00:37:06,720 --> 00:37:10,720 I'm sure there are lots of little hack groups all over the place. 1014 00:37:10,720 --> 00:37:15,720 There was one up in Massachusetts, which is pretty much disbanded at this point. 1015 00:37:15,720 --> 00:37:17,720 It seems like everybody's relocating to California. 1016 00:37:17,720 --> 00:37:19,720 That was called New Hack City for a while. 1017 00:37:19,720 --> 00:37:23,720 There is the Cult of the Dead Cow, the infamous, 1018 00:37:23,720 --> 00:37:27,720 which a couple of the members of that are actually members of the loft, such as myself. 1019 00:37:27,720 --> 00:37:29,720 So I have to give a little plug for them in there. 1020 00:37:29,720 --> 00:37:31,720 People still bow down when you say that. 1021 00:37:31,720 --> 00:37:33,720 I can attest to that right now. 1022 00:37:33,720 --> 00:37:36,720 Too, too funny. 1023 00:37:36,720 --> 00:37:37,720 Yes. 1024 00:37:37,720 --> 00:37:41,720 Well, did you want to actually run through the article the E.E. Times wrote a little bit? 1025 00:37:41,720 --> 00:37:42,720 Sure. 1026 00:37:42,720 --> 00:37:46,720 Because there are some parts that you missed that are actually much more scary than what the press let out. 1027 00:37:46,720 --> 00:37:47,720 Much more scary. 1028 00:37:47,720 --> 00:37:48,720 Not to help, you know, fan the fire. 1029 00:37:48,720 --> 00:37:53,720 Okay, well, this article is pretty much quoting the article from E.E. Times. 1030 00:37:53,720 --> 00:37:55,720 It's not the article itself. 1031 00:37:55,720 --> 00:37:58,720 So I guess I'll read what I have here. 1032 00:37:58,720 --> 00:37:59,720 Okay. 1033 00:37:59,720 --> 00:38:01,720 But keep in mind, occasionally our printer went off the page. 1034 00:38:01,720 --> 00:38:02,720 It might not make any sense. 1035 00:38:02,720 --> 00:38:03,720 That's fine. 1036 00:38:03,720 --> 00:38:04,720 I have a copy in front of myself, too. 1037 00:38:04,720 --> 00:38:05,720 Okay. 1038 00:38:05,720 --> 00:38:09,720 While Loft Crack, like other hacks before it, requires that a user have network administrative privileges 1039 00:38:09,720 --> 00:38:12,720 to access an NT network's password encryption file, 1040 00:38:12,720 --> 00:38:15,720 hackers note that common workarounds already exist if you know where to find them. 1041 00:38:15,720 --> 00:38:19,720 However, that could change soon, E.E. Times Online reports. 1042 00:38:19,720 --> 00:38:22,720 As a worldwide network of hackers who communicate via the Internet, 1043 00:38:22,720 --> 00:38:25,720 prepare an all-out assault on Windows NT. 1044 00:38:25,720 --> 00:38:27,720 I must have missed the battle cry. 1045 00:38:27,720 --> 00:38:29,720 Yeah, there was, um, let's see. 1046 00:38:29,720 --> 00:38:30,720 Let's see. 1047 00:38:30,720 --> 00:38:32,720 Well, all these hacks, yadda, yadda, yadda. 1048 00:38:32,720 --> 00:38:33,720 Already to find them. 1049 00:38:33,720 --> 00:38:36,720 Much said Microsoft has to change the way it undertakes product development. 1050 00:38:36,720 --> 00:38:37,720 Let's see. 1051 00:38:37,720 --> 00:38:40,720 Where was the part about Rev 2? 1052 00:38:40,720 --> 00:38:44,720 I think what he was trying to refer to is, in our advisory, 1053 00:38:44,720 --> 00:38:49,720 Microsoft's hiding behind, first they were hiding behind, well, don't choose simple passwords. 1054 00:38:49,720 --> 00:38:52,720 So then we came out with a tool saying, well, you know, 1055 00:38:52,720 --> 00:38:58,720 good luck getting your users to always choose passwords that are more than 14 characters in length. 1056 00:38:58,720 --> 00:39:02,720 I can't even remember some of my 8-character long Unix passwords. 1057 00:39:02,720 --> 00:39:09,720 But in version 2, we made a claim that we were working on, 1058 00:39:09,720 --> 00:39:11,720 well, let me back up for one second here. 1059 00:39:11,720 --> 00:39:14,720 Microsoft said, okay, no simple passwords. 1060 00:39:14,720 --> 00:39:18,720 Then they said, well, these are all non-issues because you have to be the administrator of the system 1061 00:39:18,720 --> 00:39:21,720 in order to get the password dumps to begin with. 1062 00:39:22,720 --> 00:39:30,720 What we found, it appears that there are actually two ways to get the dumps of the user registries, 1063 00:39:30,720 --> 00:39:35,720 which are their users and the encrypted passwords, without being the administrator. 1064 00:39:35,720 --> 00:39:41,720 And that is pretty much going to hurt Microsoft from the standpoint of, 1065 00:39:41,720 --> 00:39:43,720 that's what they're hiding behind in their marketing right now. 1066 00:39:43,720 --> 00:39:46,720 That's how they're trying to downplay all of this. 1067 00:39:46,720 --> 00:39:50,720 They're saying, to quote them, the loft makes a claim here, 1068 00:39:50,720 --> 00:39:54,720 but the claim that you can basically get administrative privileges without knowing the admin password 1069 00:39:54,720 --> 00:39:57,720 is a pretty significant claim that's unsubstantiated. 1070 00:39:57,720 --> 00:40:00,720 Right. 1071 00:40:00,720 --> 00:40:02,720 Microsoft contacted us. 1072 00:40:02,720 --> 00:40:06,720 We have it working in our network environment. 1073 00:40:06,720 --> 00:40:07,720 It is working. 1074 00:40:07,720 --> 00:40:10,720 You have to kind of hobble it along, so it's not really a real-world situation. 1075 00:40:10,720 --> 00:40:13,720 We're confident that we're going to be able to get it to work. 1076 00:40:13,720 --> 00:40:16,720 It's just a matter of, you know, the loft is not a full-time thing. 1077 00:40:16,720 --> 00:40:18,720 It doesn't pay us any money. 1078 00:40:18,720 --> 00:40:23,720 We don't do it out of the kindness of our hearts or, you know, whatever other sadistic drives 1079 00:40:23,720 --> 00:40:27,720 or, you know, sadomasochism thing keeps us going. 1080 00:40:27,720 --> 00:40:29,720 Microsoft, let's see, they came back with that one. 1081 00:40:29,720 --> 00:40:32,720 It was funny because there's another line in here that goes along with that. 1082 00:40:32,720 --> 00:40:38,720 If I could find it, something saying to the extent of, well, gee, within three days, 1083 00:40:38,720 --> 00:40:42,720 or within a day, Mudge was inundated with three e-mail messages. 1084 00:40:42,720 --> 00:40:45,720 Well, obviously, this guy hasn't gotten mail-bombed in a while 1085 00:40:45,720 --> 00:40:48,720 because inundated with three e-mail messages is not inundated at all. 1086 00:40:48,720 --> 00:40:51,720 That wasn't a typo by any chance, was it? 1087 00:40:51,720 --> 00:40:52,720 No. 1088 00:40:52,720 --> 00:40:56,720 What I had told him was, yeah, he said, have you gotten a lot of e-mail based off this? 1089 00:40:56,720 --> 00:40:57,720 I said, sure. 1090 00:40:57,720 --> 00:41:00,720 You know, I've been getting, you know, deluged with, you know, wonderful messages. 1091 00:41:00,720 --> 00:41:02,720 Some people going, well, you know, I can't get it to work. 1092 00:41:02,720 --> 00:41:04,720 Some people saying, oh, this is great. 1093 00:41:04,720 --> 00:41:05,720 I really appreciate it. 1094 00:41:05,720 --> 00:41:07,720 We're able to audit our NT networks now. 1095 00:41:07,720 --> 00:41:09,720 Some hackers going, this is fantastic. 1096 00:41:09,720 --> 00:41:13,720 I have some good examples out of the code that you're using, you know, all of which I love. 1097 00:41:13,720 --> 00:41:17,720 There were three e-mail messages that stood out that were people going, 1098 00:41:17,720 --> 00:41:21,720 in your advisory you state that in revision two, 1099 00:41:21,720 --> 00:41:24,720 you plan on being able to do this without being administrator. 1100 00:41:24,720 --> 00:41:27,720 We think we know two ways of doing it. 1101 00:41:27,720 --> 00:41:29,720 How are you doing it? 1102 00:41:29,720 --> 00:41:35,720 And what was really unique about that was we're working on the ways we're doing it number two also. 1103 00:41:35,720 --> 00:41:40,720 So we're like, hmm, chances are these people found the same things. 1104 00:41:40,720 --> 00:41:44,720 So we're confident that if we don't come out with it in the near future based upon time constraints, 1105 00:41:44,720 --> 00:41:46,720 that somebody else is going to post it. 1106 00:41:46,720 --> 00:41:48,720 Oh, yeah, that's inevitable that it's going to get out somehow. 1107 00:41:48,720 --> 00:41:53,720 The thing is you guys are making it, you know, open to everybody, 1108 00:41:53,720 --> 00:41:56,720 and that makes it much more likely that it will be addressed at some point. 1109 00:41:56,720 --> 00:41:58,720 And that's the way it should be, I think. 1110 00:41:58,720 --> 00:41:59,720 Absolutely. 1111 00:41:59,720 --> 00:42:01,720 All right, 212-279-3400. 1112 00:42:01,720 --> 00:42:03,720 Let's take our first phone call. 1113 00:42:03,720 --> 00:42:04,720 Good evening. You're on the air. 1114 00:42:04,720 --> 00:42:05,720 What? 1115 00:42:05,720 --> 00:42:06,720 You're on the air. 1116 00:42:06,720 --> 00:42:07,720 Oh. 1117 00:42:07,720 --> 00:42:08,720 Do you remember calling a radio show? 1118 00:42:08,720 --> 00:42:09,720 Oh, whoa, hey. 1119 00:42:10,720 --> 00:42:12,720 I know you've been on hold a long time, but... 1120 00:42:12,720 --> 00:42:13,720 Yeah, no kidding. 1121 00:42:13,720 --> 00:42:14,720 Okay. 1122 00:42:14,720 --> 00:42:15,720 Hi, wow. 1123 00:42:15,720 --> 00:42:16,720 How are you doing? 1124 00:42:16,720 --> 00:42:18,720 Do you have a question for our guest? 1125 00:42:18,720 --> 00:42:20,720 Actually, no. 1126 00:42:20,720 --> 00:42:23,720 You're going to say something totally off topic, as is the case usually on this show, right? 1127 00:42:23,720 --> 00:42:24,720 Yeah. 1128 00:42:24,720 --> 00:42:25,720 Okay. 1129 00:42:25,720 --> 00:42:27,720 Remember Sami? 1130 00:42:27,720 --> 00:42:28,720 Oh, yeah. 1131 00:42:28,720 --> 00:42:29,720 I read an article about him. 1132 00:42:29,720 --> 00:42:31,720 Right, you know, I'm glad you mentioned that. 1133 00:42:31,720 --> 00:42:35,720 Sami was the guy that was harassing his poor family in Ontario. 1134 00:42:35,720 --> 00:42:36,720 We read about him last week. 1135 00:42:36,720 --> 00:42:38,720 Turns out it was the son in the same house. 1136 00:42:38,720 --> 00:42:39,720 Yeah. 1137 00:42:39,720 --> 00:42:41,720 I mean, how could they not have known that? 1138 00:42:41,720 --> 00:42:42,720 That was so simple to prove. 1139 00:42:42,720 --> 00:42:43,720 I know. 1140 00:42:43,720 --> 00:42:45,720 That it was the same person who was in the house already. 1141 00:42:45,720 --> 00:42:50,720 But, yeah, it was not some super hacker someplace that was controlling the electric and the TV. 1142 00:42:50,720 --> 00:42:52,720 You know, changing the channel on the TV set. 1143 00:42:52,720 --> 00:42:53,720 Yeah. 1144 00:42:53,720 --> 00:42:57,720 You know, it's likely that somebody in the house, they just figured it out now. 1145 00:42:57,720 --> 00:42:58,720 Yeah. 1146 00:42:58,720 --> 00:42:59,720 It's like the old Hitchcock movies. 1147 00:42:59,720 --> 00:43:05,720 The mother says she's not going to press charges, and they're going to seek counseling. 1148 00:43:05,720 --> 00:43:07,720 And that's where that stands. 1149 00:43:07,720 --> 00:43:12,720 It's kind of funny, because if you go through the original article, it just makes it crack up. 1150 00:43:12,720 --> 00:43:19,720 Like, you know, how they put, what, 600 volts through the guy's phone line? 1151 00:43:19,720 --> 00:43:21,720 They sent 600 volts down the phone? 1152 00:43:21,720 --> 00:43:22,720 Yeah. 1153 00:43:22,720 --> 00:43:23,720 Yeah, I don't know where they thought they were sending it. 1154 00:43:23,720 --> 00:43:26,720 And then the kid on an extension in the basement or something saying, 1155 00:43:26,720 --> 00:43:28,720 oh, what did you do, try to blow up my equipment? 1156 00:43:28,720 --> 00:43:30,720 Yeah, I mean, he knew everything that was going on, obviously. 1157 00:43:30,720 --> 00:43:36,720 So that's why he was able to listen to conversations inside the house with the phone on the hook. 1158 00:43:36,720 --> 00:43:39,720 Because he was in the house having the conversation. 1159 00:43:39,720 --> 00:43:40,720 Yeah. 1160 00:43:40,720 --> 00:43:41,720 Oh, boy. 1161 00:43:41,720 --> 00:43:44,720 I guess, you know, those Canadian Mounties, they need a little more practice. 1162 00:43:44,720 --> 00:43:46,720 Anyway, anything else, sir? 1163 00:43:46,720 --> 00:43:47,720 I don't know. 1164 00:43:47,720 --> 00:43:49,720 Okay, well, thanks for reminding us of that. 1165 00:43:49,720 --> 00:43:50,720 Yeah, okay. 1166 00:43:50,720 --> 00:43:52,720 Glad that we settled that. 1167 00:43:52,720 --> 00:43:54,720 Okay, let's take another phone call. 1168 00:43:54,720 --> 00:43:56,720 212-279-3400. 1169 00:43:56,720 --> 00:43:57,720 Good evening. 1170 00:43:57,720 --> 00:44:02,720 Okay, well, that's not really on topic either, I don't think. 1171 00:44:02,720 --> 00:44:03,720 Good evening. 1172 00:44:03,720 --> 00:44:04,720 You're on the air. 1173 00:44:04,720 --> 00:44:05,720 Wow, he has two phones. 1174 00:44:05,720 --> 00:44:06,720 He has two phones. 1175 00:44:06,720 --> 00:44:07,720 How cool. 1176 00:44:07,720 --> 00:44:08,720 Okay, let's try again. 1177 00:44:08,720 --> 00:44:09,720 Good evening. 1178 00:44:09,720 --> 00:44:10,720 You're on the air. 1179 00:44:10,720 --> 00:44:12,720 Don't belch, please. 1180 00:44:12,720 --> 00:44:13,720 Hello? 1181 00:44:13,720 --> 00:44:14,720 Hello. 1182 00:44:14,720 --> 00:44:15,720 Yes, go ahead. 1183 00:44:15,720 --> 00:44:16,720 Hi, Mudge. 1184 00:44:16,720 --> 00:44:17,720 Great work. 1185 00:44:17,720 --> 00:44:18,720 Keep it up. 1186 00:44:18,720 --> 00:44:20,720 But this is nothing to do with you. 1187 00:44:20,720 --> 00:44:22,720 I've been out of the loop for over a year. 1188 00:44:22,720 --> 00:44:24,720 Whatever happened to Bernie S.? 1189 00:44:24,720 --> 00:44:25,720 Ah, what happened to Bernie S.? 1190 00:44:25,720 --> 00:44:30,720 Bernie S. was released in October following all kinds of abuse. 1191 00:44:30,720 --> 00:44:34,720 He's currently living in Philadelphia and trying to get his life back together. 1192 00:44:34,720 --> 00:44:38,720 And if you want more information, you should visit our website where we have the whole updated story there. 1193 00:44:38,720 --> 00:44:39,720 Wonderful. 1194 00:44:39,720 --> 00:44:40,720 Thank you very much. 1195 00:44:40,720 --> 00:44:41,720 Okay, take care. 1196 00:44:41,720 --> 00:44:44,720 You think we're going to get a single call having to do with the subject tonight? 1197 00:44:44,720 --> 00:44:45,720 No. 1198 00:44:45,720 --> 00:44:46,720 Last week was good. 1199 00:44:46,720 --> 00:44:48,720 Last week we got almost every call having to do with the subject. 1200 00:44:48,720 --> 00:44:50,720 Yeah, we'll open it up to anything. 1201 00:44:50,720 --> 00:44:52,720 Well, if I do that, there's no hope whatsoever. 1202 00:44:52,720 --> 00:44:54,720 Okay, let's try this one over here. 1203 00:44:54,720 --> 00:44:55,720 This one looks good. 1204 00:44:55,720 --> 00:44:56,720 I like the looks of this light here. 1205 00:44:56,720 --> 00:44:57,720 Good evening. 1206 00:44:57,720 --> 00:44:58,720 You're on the air. 1207 00:44:58,720 --> 00:45:00,720 If I do that, there's no hope whatsoever. 1208 00:45:00,720 --> 00:45:03,720 How long do you think it'll take them to realize that they're, in fact, on the air? 1209 00:45:03,720 --> 00:45:06,720 Will people go away and, you know, have food and things? 1210 00:45:06,720 --> 00:45:08,720 Call waiting. 1211 00:45:08,720 --> 00:45:10,720 Okay, let's try another one. 1212 00:45:10,720 --> 00:45:11,720 Good evening. 1213 00:45:11,720 --> 00:45:12,720 You're on the air. 1214 00:45:12,720 --> 00:45:13,720 Hello. 1215 00:45:13,720 --> 00:45:14,720 Yes. 1216 00:45:14,720 --> 00:45:18,720 Yes, I was going to ask a question of the gentleman, Mr. Mudge. 1217 00:45:18,720 --> 00:45:19,720 Sir, you are a god. 1218 00:45:19,720 --> 00:45:20,720 Go ahead. 1219 00:45:20,720 --> 00:45:21,720 Ask your question. 1220 00:45:21,720 --> 00:45:22,720 Sure. 1221 00:45:22,720 --> 00:45:26,720 I wanted to, first of all, I'm an attorney in the area of copyright and Internet. 1222 00:45:26,720 --> 00:45:34,720 And I wanted to ask both your and your guest's opinion about the U.S. government's position 1223 00:45:34,720 --> 00:45:39,720 concerning the new encryption codes and the key. 1224 00:45:39,720 --> 00:45:45,720 We had a lecture at the Harvard Club from Mr. Kenneth Dam where he was saying that the 1225 00:45:45,720 --> 00:45:51,720 European and the German and the other countries are trying to develop a free world of information 1226 00:45:51,720 --> 00:45:53,720 concerning encryption. 1227 00:45:53,720 --> 00:45:58,720 And yet the U.S. government seems to be kind of torn in different directions on whether 1228 00:45:58,720 --> 00:46:01,720 they want people to have that kind of information. 1229 00:46:01,720 --> 00:46:02,720 And I'll hang up. 1230 00:46:02,720 --> 00:46:04,720 And I would really appreciate you guys' response. 1231 00:46:04,720 --> 00:46:05,720 And the program is excellent. 1232 00:46:05,720 --> 00:46:06,720 Thank you. 1233 00:46:06,720 --> 00:46:07,720 Thanks. 1234 00:46:07,720 --> 00:46:09,720 And, Mudge, I'll have to ask that you limit your remarks to 45 minutes. 1235 00:46:09,720 --> 00:46:10,720 No problem. 1236 00:46:10,720 --> 00:46:11,720 Okay. 1237 00:46:11,720 --> 00:46:12,720 Oh, boy, yeah. 1238 00:46:12,720 --> 00:46:18,720 Uncle Sam is really a bit nervous about what's going on with the European countries and basically 1239 00:46:18,720 --> 00:46:24,720 crypto being developed abroad because for a long time the United States really held the, you know, 1240 00:46:24,720 --> 00:46:27,720 the keys to the Golden Kingdom in regards to crypto. 1241 00:46:27,720 --> 00:46:32,720 We had some of the top people, you know, all the way back to Friedman and the Black Chamber stuff. 1242 00:46:32,720 --> 00:46:40,720 And so it was really developed largely, you know, inside, as coming out of IBM with the NSA 1243 00:46:40,720 --> 00:46:45,720 and in conjunction with Britain's groups of crypto people. 1244 00:46:46,720 --> 00:46:50,720 And they were really happy because it turned around and they said, well, great, we have this. 1245 00:46:50,720 --> 00:46:51,720 We have this as a standard now. 1246 00:46:51,720 --> 00:46:54,720 You know, we have all these other internal things. 1247 00:46:54,720 --> 00:46:55,720 We think we're really up on it. 1248 00:46:55,720 --> 00:47:00,720 We most likely have the ability to get into most of the systems because if you think about it, 1249 00:47:00,720 --> 00:47:03,720 crypto systems are developed largely for times of war. 1250 00:47:03,720 --> 00:47:08,720 And if you develop a crypto system that even you can't break and the enemies get their hands on it, 1251 00:47:08,720 --> 00:47:11,720 you know, you've just protected the enemies from yourself. 1252 00:47:11,720 --> 00:47:14,720 This is really scaring our government to some extent. 1253 00:47:14,720 --> 00:47:19,720 And we have a horrible situation where, A, they're scared and, B, they're trying, 1254 00:47:19,720 --> 00:47:24,720 the legal side is trying to really ramp up on the technology because this is all new stuff to them. 1255 00:47:24,720 --> 00:47:29,720 I think over the next, you know, probably year you're going to see a bunch of failed attempts 1256 00:47:29,720 --> 00:47:34,720 to control crypto coming in, control the use of crypto developed abroad. 1257 00:47:34,720 --> 00:47:37,720 And ultimately it's going to, those attempts are going to fail. 1258 00:47:38,720 --> 00:47:44,720 And you're going to have, which would be wonderful, the best solution available to you 1259 00:47:44,720 --> 00:47:46,720 because you'll be able to pick and choose from whoever you want. 1260 00:47:46,720 --> 00:47:49,720 We've been hearing ultimately it's going to fail now, though, for years. 1261 00:47:49,720 --> 00:47:52,720 When is it finally going to fail and what's going to make it fail? 1262 00:47:52,720 --> 00:47:56,720 Well, what's your favorite encryption cipher right now? 1263 00:47:56,720 --> 00:47:57,720 Oh, gosh. 1264 00:47:57,720 --> 00:47:59,720 Fiber? What's yours? 1265 00:47:59,720 --> 00:48:00,720 RSA? 1266 00:48:00,720 --> 00:48:02,720 No, RSA is a good one. 1267 00:48:02,720 --> 00:48:03,720 What about IDEA? 1268 00:48:04,720 --> 00:48:08,720 I mean, if you're using symmetrical keys, such as the standard DES stuff, 1269 00:48:08,720 --> 00:48:13,720 I don't know many people or many organizations, you know, unless they're under government contract, 1270 00:48:13,720 --> 00:48:18,720 that are still, you know, I mean, banks have to still do this to a large extent, 1271 00:48:18,720 --> 00:48:21,720 that are still saying, yeah, DES is the way to go. 1272 00:48:21,720 --> 00:48:23,720 And people are saying, well, it's a small key, 1273 00:48:23,720 --> 00:48:27,720 and there's the International Data Encryption Algorithm, IDEA, developed overseas, 1274 00:48:27,720 --> 00:48:29,720 and that's really taken off. 1275 00:48:29,720 --> 00:48:32,720 Even when you look at something like PGP, 1276 00:48:32,720 --> 00:48:40,720 that's just using the, you know, RSA-ish mechanism of asymmetrical key exchange, 1277 00:48:40,720 --> 00:48:44,720 and the actual payload in there is encrypted with DES, in this case, 1278 00:48:44,720 --> 00:48:47,720 or triple DES, or IDEA, as it happens to be with PGP. 1279 00:48:47,720 --> 00:48:51,720 So I think you'll start seeing, as soon as the RSA patent runs out, 1280 00:48:51,720 --> 00:48:55,720 you know, the ability for many more people to come up with their public-private key exchanges. 1281 00:48:55,720 --> 00:48:57,720 I think it's already fallen. 1282 00:48:57,720 --> 00:48:58,720 Okay, let's go back to the phones. 1283 00:48:58,720 --> 00:49:01,720 212-279-3400. 1284 00:49:01,720 --> 00:49:04,720 Good evening, you're on the air. 1285 00:49:04,720 --> 00:49:06,720 Speak up, please. 1286 00:49:06,720 --> 00:49:08,720 Okay, new rule, new rule. 1287 00:49:08,720 --> 00:49:09,720 You have to talk. 1288 00:49:09,720 --> 00:49:12,720 You have to be next to the, no, I mean, these people, 1289 00:49:12,720 --> 00:49:15,720 they put down the phone and they go over to the radio, all right? 1290 00:49:15,720 --> 00:49:16,720 The only way you're going to do that is if, you know, 1291 00:49:16,720 --> 00:49:18,720 you're going to have the radio next to the phone, you can do it that way. 1292 00:49:18,720 --> 00:49:19,720 Who got on the phone? 1293 00:49:19,720 --> 00:49:21,720 Okay, all right. 1294 00:49:21,720 --> 00:49:22,720 Yeah, who's there? 1295 00:49:22,720 --> 00:49:23,720 I don't know. 1296 00:49:23,720 --> 00:49:27,720 Good evening, you're on the air. 1297 00:49:27,720 --> 00:49:28,720 Anybody there? 1298 00:49:28,720 --> 00:49:29,720 I'm here. 1299 00:49:29,720 --> 00:49:31,720 Go ahead, speak up. 1300 00:49:31,720 --> 00:49:34,720 I have a question. 1301 00:49:34,720 --> 00:49:35,720 It's not really pretty mundane. 1302 00:49:35,720 --> 00:49:37,720 It's not related to your topic. 1303 00:49:37,720 --> 00:49:42,720 Okay, well, make it fast, all right? 1304 00:49:42,720 --> 00:49:44,720 You've got to speak faster than that, I'm sorry. 1305 00:49:44,720 --> 00:49:46,720 Good evening, you're on the air. 1306 00:49:46,720 --> 00:49:47,720 Hello? 1307 00:49:47,720 --> 00:49:48,720 Yes. 1308 00:49:48,720 --> 00:49:49,720 Hello? 1309 00:49:49,720 --> 00:49:52,720 Yes, go ahead, speak up. 1310 00:49:52,720 --> 00:49:53,720 All right. 1311 00:49:53,720 --> 00:49:54,720 What's going on today? 1312 00:49:54,720 --> 00:49:56,720 They spray something in the air? 1313 00:49:56,720 --> 00:49:58,720 Okay, I want to talk to them. 1314 00:49:58,720 --> 00:50:02,720 Okay, please, talk into the phone. 1315 00:50:02,720 --> 00:50:04,720 All right, I don't know what's going on out there. 1316 00:50:04,720 --> 00:50:08,720 What, people invading or something and spraying stupidity through the airwaves? 1317 00:50:08,720 --> 00:50:10,720 Look, it's very simple, okay? 1318 00:50:10,720 --> 00:50:12,720 We've had, oh, you know what? 1319 00:50:12,720 --> 00:50:13,720 We lost Mudge. 1320 00:50:13,720 --> 00:50:14,720 Did we? 1321 00:50:14,720 --> 00:50:15,720 Yeah, I don't know how we lost him. 1322 00:50:15,720 --> 00:50:16,720 Huh. 1323 00:50:16,720 --> 00:50:17,720 I don't know how we lost him. 1324 00:50:17,720 --> 00:50:18,720 I wasn't talking to him. 1325 00:50:18,720 --> 00:50:20,720 Good evening, you're on the air. 1326 00:50:20,720 --> 00:50:23,720 Watch, this is going to be a question for Mudge. 1327 00:50:23,720 --> 00:50:24,720 Hello? 1328 00:50:24,720 --> 00:50:27,720 Yes, go ahead, speak up. 1329 00:50:27,720 --> 00:50:28,720 Well, I don't understand. 1330 00:50:28,720 --> 00:50:29,720 What's going on? 1331 00:50:29,720 --> 00:50:31,720 Is this some sort of worldwide conspiracy of stupidity or something? 1332 00:50:31,720 --> 00:50:33,720 I don't get it. 1333 00:50:33,720 --> 00:50:35,720 I mean, we've been doing this show now since, what, for years? 1334 00:50:35,720 --> 00:50:37,720 They must be new callers. 1335 00:50:37,720 --> 00:50:39,720 I don't know what's going on. 1336 00:50:39,720 --> 00:50:44,720 Everyone sounds really puzzled when they pick up the phone. 1337 00:50:44,720 --> 00:50:46,720 Okay, I'm really puzzled, I'll say that. 1338 00:50:46,720 --> 00:50:48,720 All right, let's see if this is Mudge again. 1339 00:50:48,720 --> 00:50:50,720 Mudge, is this you? 1340 00:50:50,720 --> 00:50:53,720 Mudge, are you there? 1341 00:50:53,720 --> 00:50:54,720 Okay. 1342 00:50:54,720 --> 00:50:55,720 Hello, Manuel. 1343 00:50:55,720 --> 00:50:57,720 Yes, is this Mudge? 1344 00:50:57,720 --> 00:50:59,720 Hello? 1345 00:50:59,720 --> 00:51:03,720 Wait a minute, I'm beginning to think there's something wrong with our phone system. 1346 00:51:03,720 --> 00:51:06,720 Mudge, can you hear me? 1347 00:51:06,720 --> 00:51:08,720 I guess not. 1348 00:51:08,720 --> 00:51:10,720 Okay, something's wrong with our phone system. 1349 00:51:10,720 --> 00:51:13,720 In which case, I have to apologize to everybody I've just yelled at 1350 00:51:13,720 --> 00:51:16,720 because they can't seem to hear me for some reason. 1351 00:51:16,720 --> 00:51:19,720 All right. 1352 00:51:19,720 --> 00:51:22,720 Anybody want to take a look at this board here? 1353 00:51:22,720 --> 00:51:27,720 Okay, either this is a mass conspiracy of some sort and everybody... 1354 00:51:27,720 --> 00:51:29,720 I'm sorry? 1355 00:51:29,720 --> 00:51:30,720 I didn't mess anything up. 1356 00:51:30,720 --> 00:51:31,720 Don't accuse me of messing anything up. 1357 00:51:31,720 --> 00:51:35,720 I didn't touch a thing. 1358 00:51:35,720 --> 00:51:37,720 No, no, no. 1359 00:51:37,720 --> 00:51:39,720 Okay, I don't know what's going on. 1360 00:51:39,720 --> 00:51:44,720 Someone could maybe verify that we're... 1361 00:51:44,720 --> 00:51:46,720 No, it's not an audition. 1362 00:51:46,720 --> 00:51:49,720 That's the right switch. 1363 00:51:49,720 --> 00:51:50,720 Okay. 1364 00:51:50,720 --> 00:51:53,720 Obviously, nobody can hear us on the phone, so we're going to have to... 1365 00:51:53,720 --> 00:51:54,720 We're going to have to wing it. 1366 00:51:54,720 --> 00:51:57,720 We're going to have to wing it and talk about things that have nothing to do with... 1367 00:51:57,720 --> 00:51:58,720 Well, hold on. 1368 00:51:58,720 --> 00:52:03,720 This is something where an operator can actually help us here. 1369 00:52:03,720 --> 00:52:09,720 Let's contact an operator on the phone and see if they can hear us. 1370 00:52:09,720 --> 00:52:10,720 All right. 1371 00:52:10,720 --> 00:52:14,720 Why are we subjecting our listeners to this kind of abuse when we can abuse an operator? 1372 00:52:14,720 --> 00:52:15,720 Right? 1373 00:52:15,720 --> 00:52:17,720 It's only fair. 1374 00:52:17,720 --> 00:52:18,720 9X, can't be. 1375 00:52:18,720 --> 00:52:20,720 Yes, hello, operator? 1376 00:52:20,720 --> 00:52:21,720 Can you hear me? 1377 00:52:21,720 --> 00:52:22,720 This is the 9X operator. 1378 00:52:22,720 --> 00:52:23,720 Yes, can you hear me? 1379 00:52:23,720 --> 00:52:25,720 Operator, can you hear me? 1380 00:52:25,720 --> 00:52:29,720 Why you... 1381 00:52:29,720 --> 00:52:31,720 See, with 9X, it's hard to tell. 1382 00:52:31,720 --> 00:52:34,720 I don't know if they put this tongue up on me or if... 1383 00:52:34,720 --> 00:52:35,720 Okay. 1384 00:52:35,720 --> 00:52:36,720 Well, it's okay. 1385 00:52:36,720 --> 00:52:38,720 It's not like BAI needs its phone system or anything like that. 1386 00:52:38,720 --> 00:52:41,720 It's not like we need to be able to talk to our listeners. 1387 00:52:41,720 --> 00:52:44,720 You see anything that's obviously wrong? 1388 00:52:44,720 --> 00:52:45,720 I had to do that one week. 1389 00:52:45,720 --> 00:52:46,720 You had to do that one week? 1390 00:52:46,720 --> 00:52:47,720 You had to hit that little button? 1391 00:52:47,720 --> 00:52:49,720 Let's try 9X again and see if... 1392 00:52:49,720 --> 00:52:51,720 Why don't you take one of the caller? 1393 00:52:51,720 --> 00:52:52,720 Okay. 1394 00:52:52,720 --> 00:52:53,720 Yeah, you know, it's probably better to take a caller. 1395 00:52:53,720 --> 00:52:54,720 Let's see if we can take Mudge. 1396 00:52:54,720 --> 00:52:56,720 Mudge, are you there? 1397 00:52:56,720 --> 00:52:59,720 See, Mudge is here, but he can't hear us. 1398 00:52:59,720 --> 00:53:03,720 Let's see if we can communicate with touch tones. 1399 00:53:03,720 --> 00:53:05,720 Can you hear that? 1400 00:53:05,720 --> 00:53:06,720 Okay. 1401 00:53:06,720 --> 00:53:08,720 I don't think he could hear that. 1402 00:53:08,720 --> 00:53:09,720 I don't know. 1403 00:53:09,720 --> 00:53:11,720 They seem to be having a difficult time here. 1404 00:53:11,720 --> 00:53:13,720 I'm getting a touch tone burst. 1405 00:53:13,720 --> 00:53:16,720 Okay. 1406 00:53:16,720 --> 00:53:18,720 Let's see if we can communicate with Mudge. 1407 00:53:18,720 --> 00:53:19,720 Okay. 1408 00:53:19,720 --> 00:53:22,720 He's... 1409 00:53:22,720 --> 00:53:23,720 This is... 1410 00:53:23,720 --> 00:53:24,720 Okay. 1411 00:53:24,720 --> 00:53:25,720 He knows that there's a problem. 1412 00:53:25,720 --> 00:53:26,720 This guy's into cryptography. 1413 00:53:26,720 --> 00:53:27,720 He should be able to figure this out. 1414 00:53:27,720 --> 00:53:30,720 Now, there must be a way to communicate using this somehow. 1415 00:53:30,720 --> 00:53:31,720 Oh, pick up the phone. 1416 00:53:31,720 --> 00:53:32,720 Okay. 1417 00:53:32,720 --> 00:53:34,720 I could do that. 1418 00:53:34,720 --> 00:53:37,720 Hey, Mudge, can you hear me? 1419 00:53:37,720 --> 00:53:40,720 Actually, maybe somebody else could do that, and I could do the radio show. 1420 00:53:40,720 --> 00:53:42,720 Hello? 1421 00:53:42,720 --> 00:53:43,720 Okay. 1422 00:53:43,720 --> 00:53:46,720 We're trying to communicate with Mudge and tell him that there's a problem. 1423 00:53:46,720 --> 00:53:50,720 Unfortunately, until we figure out what's wrong with our phone system... 1424 00:53:50,720 --> 00:53:51,720 What, did you hang up on him? 1425 00:53:51,720 --> 00:53:52,720 No, no, no. 1426 00:53:52,720 --> 00:53:53,720 What happened? 1427 00:53:53,720 --> 00:53:54,720 Okay. 1428 00:53:54,720 --> 00:53:56,720 Well, if that line rings again, just tell him. 1429 00:53:56,720 --> 00:53:57,720 Boy, we look like idiots here. 1430 00:53:57,720 --> 00:53:59,720 This has never happened before. 1431 00:53:59,720 --> 00:54:00,720 Okay. 1432 00:54:00,720 --> 00:54:01,720 Well, he can't hear me. 1433 00:54:01,720 --> 00:54:02,720 Maybe. 1434 00:54:02,720 --> 00:54:03,720 Wait. 1435 00:54:04,720 --> 00:54:06,720 Mudge, can you hear me? 1436 00:54:06,720 --> 00:54:08,720 No, I'm not hearing the end of the conversation. 1437 00:54:08,720 --> 00:54:09,720 You've got to pick up that phone. 1438 00:54:09,720 --> 00:54:10,720 Let's put him on hold first. 1439 00:54:10,720 --> 00:54:11,720 Yeah. 1440 00:54:11,720 --> 00:54:12,720 Okay. 1441 00:54:14,720 --> 00:54:16,720 Okay, we've got to put him on hold somehow. 1442 00:54:16,720 --> 00:54:17,720 Yeah. 1443 00:54:17,720 --> 00:54:20,720 All right, you've got to figure out how that little instrument works. 1444 00:54:20,720 --> 00:54:22,720 Hello? 1445 00:54:22,720 --> 00:54:25,720 Okay, well, we only have two minutes to kill now 1446 00:54:25,720 --> 00:54:30,720 because we've spent all this time talking about the phone problems. 1447 00:54:30,720 --> 00:54:32,720 Do you want to read this letter that we got? 1448 00:54:32,720 --> 00:54:33,720 Sure. 1449 00:54:33,720 --> 00:54:34,720 Okay, we've got... 1450 00:54:34,720 --> 00:54:36,720 Even though we can't communicate with our local listeners, 1451 00:54:36,720 --> 00:54:39,720 we are getting mail from people all over the country. 1452 00:54:39,720 --> 00:54:46,720 And those people are sending us mail concerning our PCS discussions. 1453 00:54:46,720 --> 00:54:47,720 Actually, why don't you read this? 1454 00:54:47,720 --> 00:54:48,720 Okay. 1455 00:54:48,720 --> 00:54:49,720 I can deal with the phone over here. 1456 00:54:49,720 --> 00:54:50,720 Okay. 1457 00:54:50,720 --> 00:54:53,720 He says he was just listening to our April 8th edition of Off the Hook, 1458 00:54:53,720 --> 00:54:55,720 and he loved it. 1459 00:54:55,720 --> 00:55:00,720 He says he wanted to clarify a few things about the PCS segment. 1460 00:55:00,720 --> 00:55:04,720 He's an indirect marketer for PrimeCo Personal Communications 1461 00:55:04,720 --> 00:55:06,720 in Hampton Roads, Virginia, 1462 00:55:06,720 --> 00:55:10,720 and he basically supports the radio shacks in Circuit Cities 1463 00:55:10,720 --> 00:55:13,720 and other indirect retailers. 1464 00:55:13,720 --> 00:55:17,720 They say that they have the third largest PCS presence in the U.S. 1465 00:55:17,720 --> 00:55:22,720 after AT&T and Sprint. 1466 00:55:22,720 --> 00:55:25,720 What he seems to want to do is clarify a few things 1467 00:55:25,720 --> 00:55:29,720 concerning CDMA versus TDMA. 1468 00:55:29,720 --> 00:55:35,720 And I'm actually in agreement with some of the things that he says 1469 00:55:35,720 --> 00:55:45,720 about CDMA being the direction that corporations are going in. 1470 00:55:45,720 --> 00:55:48,720 Of course, with GSM, that isn't the case. 1471 00:55:48,720 --> 00:55:53,720 GSM is currently using TDMA. 1472 00:55:54,720 --> 00:56:03,720 I've mentioned in the past that ultimately companies, for example, OmniPoint, 1473 00:56:03,720 --> 00:56:08,720 which currently use GSM, they ultimately plan on supporting CDMA, 1474 00:56:08,720 --> 00:56:15,720 and they actually have one of the actual standards that they've come out with, 1475 00:56:15,720 --> 00:56:24,720 IS661, is an actual hybrid of GSM using TDMA as well as CDMA. 1476 00:56:24,720 --> 00:56:31,720 And while this isn't actually in place as of yet, to my knowledge, in New York City, 1477 00:56:31,720 --> 00:56:34,720 hopefully it will be in the very near future. 1478 00:56:34,720 --> 00:56:36,720 I just think it's cool that we're getting mail from people. 1479 00:56:36,720 --> 00:56:37,720 Where is that, Virginia? 1480 00:56:37,720 --> 00:56:41,720 He's in Errol's. 1481 00:56:41,720 --> 00:56:42,720 It was you, wasn't it? 1482 00:56:42,720 --> 00:56:43,720 It was Mr. Patchcable? 1483 00:56:43,720 --> 00:56:44,720 Somebody patched us out. 1484 00:56:44,720 --> 00:56:45,720 How do you like that? 1485 00:56:45,720 --> 00:56:46,720 Mudge, are you back with us? 1486 00:56:46,720 --> 00:56:47,720 Yes, I'm back with you. 1487 00:56:47,720 --> 00:56:48,720 Okay. 1488 00:56:48,720 --> 00:56:51,720 It was a studio engineer that plugged up a hole there. 1489 00:56:51,720 --> 00:56:53,720 He must be on Microsoft's payroll. 1490 00:56:53,720 --> 00:56:55,720 Okay. 1491 00:56:55,720 --> 00:56:57,720 He'll be doing pennants for a while. 1492 00:56:57,720 --> 00:56:58,720 Okay. 1493 00:56:58,720 --> 00:57:00,720 Well, we only have a minute left. 1494 00:57:00,720 --> 00:57:04,720 So, Mudge, why don't you give out your information so that people can get ahold of you. 1495 00:57:04,720 --> 00:57:05,720 Okay. 1496 00:57:05,720 --> 00:57:10,720 And find out more about this interesting bug and things that the loft does. 1497 00:57:10,720 --> 00:57:11,720 Great. 1498 00:57:11,720 --> 00:57:14,720 Anyone interested in the loft and what we do can connect to the website, 1499 00:57:14,720 --> 00:57:19,720 which is www.loft, which is L0PHT.com. 1500 00:57:19,720 --> 00:57:23,720 Email can be addressed to Mudge, M-U-D-G-E, at loft.com. 1501 00:57:23,720 --> 00:57:28,720 The other seven members I will definitely forward on to if you don't know who they are 1502 00:57:28,720 --> 00:57:29,720 or want to find out who they are. 1503 00:57:29,720 --> 00:57:32,720 The other person who helped write the loft crack program is Weld, 1504 00:57:32,720 --> 00:57:36,720 who can be reached at weld at W-E-L-D at loft.com. 1505 00:57:36,720 --> 00:57:38,720 And the information on the actual program and the program itself 1506 00:57:38,720 --> 00:57:41,720 are off of the advisories page from the main page. 1507 00:57:41,720 --> 00:57:45,720 And, Emmanuel and Fiber, I thank you very much for letting me take part in this. 1508 00:57:45,720 --> 00:57:46,720 Okay. 1509 00:57:46,720 --> 00:57:49,720 And before we leave, we have with us now the studio engineer who messed up the whole show, 1510 00:57:49,720 --> 00:57:54,720 who's going to personally apologize to everybody that I've insulted tonight. 1511 00:57:54,720 --> 00:57:56,720 Claude, go ahead. 1512 00:57:56,720 --> 00:58:00,720 Well, they certainly were entertaining insults. 1513 00:58:00,720 --> 00:58:07,720 Trying to set up a show beyond Scott, it's difficult. 1514 00:58:07,720 --> 00:58:08,720 I'm sorry. 1515 00:58:08,720 --> 00:58:11,720 And I apologize to you especially, but also your listeners. 1516 00:58:11,720 --> 00:58:14,720 I mean, I'm sure my listeners can understand this kind of a thing. 1517 00:58:14,720 --> 00:58:16,720 But what are all these patch cables for? 1518 00:58:16,720 --> 00:58:20,720 Is this some sort of special presentation that you'd like to promote now? 1519 00:58:20,720 --> 00:58:25,720 Actually, at about quarter of 11, there will be Poison Darts, 1520 00:58:25,720 --> 00:58:30,720 and they have an identical cousin direct from Texas. 1521 00:58:30,720 --> 00:58:31,720 They do that every week. 1522 00:58:31,720 --> 00:58:32,720 I see. 1523 00:58:32,720 --> 00:58:33,720 Okay. 1524 00:58:33,720 --> 00:58:34,720 I stand. 1525 00:58:34,720 --> 00:58:35,720 All right. 1526 00:58:35,720 --> 00:58:37,720 Is that the ISDN line you were hooking up just now? 1527 00:58:37,720 --> 00:58:38,720 Mm-hmm. 1528 00:58:38,720 --> 00:58:41,720 So we got victimized by ISDN yet again. 1529 00:58:41,720 --> 00:58:42,720 All right. 1530 00:58:42,720 --> 00:58:43,720 Well, that's just fine. 1531 00:58:43,720 --> 00:58:44,720 Okay. 1532 00:58:44,720 --> 00:58:45,720 That's going to do it for us here this week. 1533 00:58:45,720 --> 00:58:46,720 Thanks very much, Mudge, for being part of this. 1534 00:58:46,720 --> 00:58:47,720 My pleasure. 1535 00:58:47,720 --> 00:58:48,720 Thanks for having me. 1536 00:58:48,720 --> 00:58:49,720 All right. 1537 00:58:49,720 --> 00:58:50,720 Take care. 1538 00:58:50,720 --> 00:58:51,720 We'll be back again next week. 1539 00:58:51,720 --> 00:58:52,720 By the way, Mudge and the Loft crew will be at Beyond Hope in August, 1540 00:58:52,720 --> 00:58:54,720 so be sure to drop by then. 1541 00:58:54,720 --> 00:58:55,720 We'll have more information there. 1542 00:58:55,720 --> 00:58:57,720 Our new website is up now, www.hope.net. 1543 00:58:57,720 --> 00:58:58,720 Check it out. 1544 00:58:58,720 --> 00:58:59,720 We have hotel information finally. 1545 00:58:59,720 --> 00:59:02,720 Of course, those of you who are here in New York City probably won't need that, 1546 00:59:02,720 --> 00:59:04,720 but then again, those of you listening on the web probably will. 1547 00:59:04,720 --> 00:59:06,720 Until next week, this is Emanuel Goldstein. 1548 00:59:06,720 --> 00:59:07,720 Have a good night. 1549 00:59:07,720 --> 00:59:08,720 Good night. 1550 00:59:08,720 --> 00:59:09,720 Good night. 1551 00:59:09,720 --> 00:59:10,720 Good night. 1552 00:59:10,720 --> 00:59:11,720 Good night. 1553 00:59:11,720 --> 00:59:12,720 Good night. 1554 00:59:12,720 --> 00:59:13,720 Good night. 1555 00:59:13,720 --> 00:59:14,720 Good night. 1556 00:59:14,720 --> 00:59:15,720 Good night. 1557 00:59:15,720 --> 00:59:16,720 Good night. 1558 00:59:16,720 --> 00:59:17,720 Good night. 1559 00:59:17,720 --> 00:59:18,720 Good night. 1560 00:59:18,720 --> 00:59:19,720 Good night. 1561 00:59:19,720 --> 00:59:20,720 Good night. 1562 00:59:20,720 --> 00:59:21,720 Good night. 1563 00:59:21,720 --> 00:59:22,720 Good night. 1564 00:59:22,720 --> 00:59:23,720 Good night. 1565 00:59:23,720 --> 00:59:24,720 Good night. 1566 00:59:24,720 --> 00:59:25,720 Good night. 1567 00:59:25,720 --> 00:59:26,720 Good night. 1568 00:59:26,720 --> 00:59:27,720 Good night. 1569 00:59:27,720 --> 00:59:28,720 Good night. 1570 00:59:28,720 --> 00:59:29,720 Good night. 1571 00:59:29,720 --> 00:59:30,720 Good night. 1572 00:59:30,720 --> 00:59:31,720 Good night. 1573 00:59:31,720 --> 00:59:32,720 Good night. 1574 00:59:32,720 --> 00:59:33,720 Good night. 1575 00:59:33,720 --> 00:59:34,720 Good night. 1576 00:59:34,720 --> 00:59:35,720 Good night. 1577 00:59:35,720 --> 00:59:36,720 Good night. 1578 00:59:36,720 --> 00:59:37,720 Good night. 1579 00:59:37,720 --> 00:59:38,720 Good night. 1580 00:59:38,720 --> 00:59:39,720 Good night. 1581 00:59:39,720 --> 00:59:40,720 Good night. 1582 00:59:40,720 --> 00:59:41,720 Good night. 1583 00:59:41,720 --> 00:59:42,720 Good night. 1584 00:59:42,720 --> 00:59:43,720 Good night. 1585 00:59:43,720 --> 00:59:44,720 Good night. 1586 00:59:44,720 --> 00:59:45,720 Good night. 1587 00:59:45,720 --> 00:59:46,720 Good night. 1588 00:59:46,720 --> 00:59:47,720 Good night. 1589 00:59:47,720 --> 00:59:48,720 Good night. 1590 00:59:48,720 --> 00:59:49,720 Good night. 1591 00:59:49,720 --> 00:59:50,720 Good night. 1592 00:59:50,720 --> 00:59:51,720 Good night. 1593 00:59:51,720 --> 00:59:52,720 Good night. 1594 00:59:52,720 --> 00:59:53,720 Good night. 1595 00:59:53,720 --> 00:59:54,720 Good night. 1596 00:59:54,720 --> 00:59:55,720 Good night. 1597 00:59:55,720 --> 00:59:56,720 Good night. 1598 00:59:56,720 --> 00:59:57,720 Good night. 1599 00:59:57,720 --> 00:59:58,720 Good night. 1600 00:59:58,720 --> 00:59:59,720 Good night. 1601 00:59:59,720 --> 01:00:00,720 Good night. 1602 01:00:00,720 --> 01:00:01,720 Good night. 1603 01:00:01,720 --> 01:00:02,720 Good night. 1604 01:00:02,720 --> 01:00:03,720 Good night. 1605 01:00:03,720 --> 01:00:04,720 Good night. 1606 01:00:04,720 --> 01:00:05,720 Good night. 1607 01:00:05,720 --> 01:00:06,720 Good night. 1608 01:00:06,720 --> 01:00:07,720 Good night. 1609 01:00:07,720 --> 01:00:08,720 Good night. 1610 01:00:08,720 --> 01:00:09,720 Good night. 1611 01:00:09,720 --> 01:00:10,720 Good night. 1612 01:00:10,720 --> 01:00:11,720 Good night. 1613 01:00:11,720 --> 01:00:12,720 Good night. 1614 01:00:12,720 --> 01:00:13,720 Good night. 1615 01:00:13,720 --> 01:00:14,720 Good night. 1616 01:00:14,720 --> 01:00:15,720 Good night. 1617 01:00:15,720 --> 01:00:16,720 Good night. 1618 01:00:16,720 --> 01:00:17,720 Good night. 1619 01:00:17,720 --> 01:00:18,720 Good night. 1620 01:00:18,720 --> 01:00:19,720 Good night. 1621 01:00:19,720 --> 01:00:20,720 Good night. 1622 01:00:20,720 --> 01:00:21,720 Good night. 1623 01:00:21,720 --> 01:00:22,720 Good night. 1624 01:00:22,720 --> 01:00:23,720 Good night. 1625 01:00:23,720 --> 01:00:24,720 Good night. 1626 01:00:24,720 --> 01:00:25,720 Good night. 1627 01:00:25,720 --> 01:00:26,720 Good night. 1628 01:00:26,720 --> 01:00:27,720 Good night. 1629 01:00:27,720 --> 01:00:28,720 Good night. 1630 01:00:28,720 --> 01:00:29,720 Good night. 1631 01:00:29,720 --> 01:00:30,720 Good night. 1632 01:00:30,720 --> 01:00:31,720 Good night. 1633 01:00:31,720 --> 01:00:32,720 Good night. 1634 01:00:32,720 --> 01:00:33,720 Good night. 1635 01:00:33,720 --> 01:00:34,720 Good night.